UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA

IN RE: Case No. 08-35653(KRH)

CIRCUIT CITY STORES 701 East Broad Street

INC., Richmond, VA 23219

Debtor. . January 16, 2009

11:00 a.m.

TRANSCRIPT OF HEARING BEFORE HONORABLE KEVIN R. HUENNEKENS UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT JUDGE

APPEARANCES:

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In the matter of Circuit City Stores, THE CLERK: Incorporated. Case Number 08-35653. Hearing on Items one through 32 as set out on today's amended agenda.

> MR. FOLEY: Good morning, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Good morning, Mr. Foley.

MR. FOLEY: Doug Foley with McGuireWoods on behalf of Circuit City. With me at counsel table is Gregg Galardi from Skadden Arps. Your Honor, we're here on the agenda that we filed this morning. We thank the Court for allowing us to \mid start at 11 rather than ten. As I explained to chambers earlier this morning, there's been a lot of work over the last several days in New York and a lot of the constituencies needed time to get down here, so we appreciate the Court for accommodating the schedule change.

Your Honor, the agenda that we filed this morning, we 16 would propose to go through that, the first six items are matters that have been resolved and I'll briefly go through 18 those and then matters seven through 13 are either matters that have been adjourned by agreement to a future hearing date or are otherwise resolved. And then matters 14 through 21 are uncontested matters. And then the contested matters, potentially contested matters are Items 22 through 32.

THE COURT: Very good, Mr. Foley.

MR. FOLEY: Your Honor, the first matter is the complaint for declaratory judgment regarding a constructive

1 trust by Greystone Data Systems. Your Honor is aware we filed $2 \parallel$ a Rule 12(b)(6) motion with respect to that adversary 3 proceeding and complaint. We've agreed with counsel for the 4 plaintiff to have a briefing schedule that would run 15 days 5 from today to file a responsive pleading and then a ten-day 6 period to file a reply pleading and then have a hearing on that Rule 12(b)(6) motion on the February 13th hearing docket. So that would put the response date of February 2nd, and then a reply brief date of February 12th with a hearing on February 13th. I believe counsel for Greystone is here.

THE COURT: All right.

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MR. DESIDERIO: Good morning. Chris Desiderio from Nixon Peabody on behalf of Greystone Data Systems. What counsel's represented, we've agreed to and that briefing schedule is acceptable.

THE COURT: All right. It's satisfactory to the Court, so that will be fine.

MR. DESIDERIO: Thank you.

THE COURT: It's approved.

MR. FOLEY: Thank, Your Honor. With respect to Item Number 2, Your Honor, this is a motion under 365(d)(3) and 503(b) by Pratt Center Valley and Valley Corner Shopping Center. That has been resolved and can be removed from the docket.

MS. HUDSON: Your Honor, Lisa Hudson here for Pratt

Center and Valley Corners. And Mr. Foley's representation is 2 correct. We believe the forthcoming order will adequately resolve our concerns.

THE COURT: Very good. Thank you.

MS. HUDSON: Thank, Your Honor.

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Item Number 3 on the docket is a motion MR. FOLEY: for filing a certain document under seal by Alliance Entertainment and we have consented to an order in that regard and I believe it has been submitted to chambers.

THE COURT: That will be granted.

MR. FOLEY: Thank you, Your Honor. Item Number 4, 12 \parallel this is a motion under 365(d)(3) and 503(b) filed by Acadia Realty, Limited Partnership. This one has also been resolved, 14 Your Honor and can be removed from the docket.

THE COURT: It will be removed.

MR. FOLEY: Your Honor, Number 5 is the motion to compel payment of the administrative post-petition rent by Madison Waldorf, LLC. Your Honor, this matter has also been 19 resolved.

MR. WEITZMAN: Mitchell Weitzman, counsel for Madison Waldorf, LLC. It's resolved. This landlord stipulates that the Court's prior rulings with respect to stub rent would be applicable to this motion with the reservation that we can seek reconsideration along with the other landlords, and we have joined in that motion for reconsideration.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you, sir.

MR. FOLEY: Thank, Your Honor. Item Number 6 is motion by Port Authority Holdings III, Ltd., for an order also under 365(d(3) and 503(b). This matter's also been resolved and can be removed from the docket.

THE COURT: All right.

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MR. FOLEY: Your Honor, Item Number 7 is a motion from relief of stay filed by Mansfield SEQ 287WLTD. And we have agreed with opposing counsel to adjourn this matter, preliminary hearing on this matter to the January 29th hearing date.

MS. HUDSON: Your Honor, Lisa Hudson of Sands

Anderson here on behalf of Mansfield SEQ287 and WLTD, and Mr.

Foley's presentation is correct. We've agreed to adjourn this to January 29th at ten.

THE COURT: All right, so it will be heard on the 29th.

MS. HUDSON: Yes, Your Honor.

MR. FOLEY: Thank, Your Honor. Item Number 8 is
Navarre Distribution Services motion for adequate protection.
Your Honor, this matter we have agreed with opposing counsel to adjourn to the February 13th omnibus hearing date.

THE COURT: It will be continued to the 13th.

MR. FOLEY: Thank, Your Honor. Matter Number 9, Your Honor, is the motion by Motorola for allowance and payment of

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29th hearing date.

24 THE COURT: And Number 10? Okay.

> Your Honor, that one is also a motion for MR. FOLEY:

1 payment of administrative claim under 503(b)(9) by General 2 Instruments Corporation doing business as Home and Networks Mobility Business. We have also agreed with opposing counsel to adjourn that matter to the January 29th hearing date.

THE COURT: All right. All right, then we're back up to Number 13.

Back up to Number 13, Your Honor. If you MR. FOLEY: recall at the last hearing Your Honor entered an order, a stipulated order that we agreed to with the Committee with respect to certain taxing jurisdictions as to whether or not we had authority under the first day order to pay pre-petition 12∥taxes as trust funds. Your Honor entered an order, made certain findings with respect to those jurisdictions, required us to serve them, which we did. The certificate of service is listed on the agenda. We have received no objections by any of those taxing authorities and jurisdictions to Your Honor's stipulated order. So there's nothing really to do other to announce that that order is now final with respect to those parties.

THE COURT: All right.

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MR. FOLEY: Your Honor, Items 14 and 15 are the Committee's employment papers. I'll have Mr. Pomerantz address the Court on that.

MR. POMERANTZ: Thank you, Your Honor. 25 Pomerantz of Pachulski, Stang, Zeil and Jones on behalf of the

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Committee. Item Number 14 is the Committee's application to 2 employ my firm as general bankruptcy counsel. We have not received any opposition and an order has been BOP'd.

> THE COURT: That employment will be approved.

Thank, Your Honor. MR. POMERANTZ:

MR. FOLEY: And Number 15 is the application of the Committee to employ Tabner and Baron as local counsel, and no objections have been made to that application, and that order has also been BOP'd.

THE COURT: And that employment will also be approved.

MR. FOLEY: Your Honor, I think that brings us to Item Number 16 on the agenda and 17, which go together. is a motion to approve a settlement between Verizon Wireless and the debtors, the result of which is to essentially net out and set off certain commissions, charge back, service fees, and the net result of all of the setoffs is that payment coming to the estate of \$1,858,084.76. We have not received any opposition to the motion. We've asked the Court to approve it.

THE COURT: Does any party wish to be heard in connection with the motion for the approval of the settlement agreement with Verizon?

MS. KELBON: Good morning, Your Honor. Regina Stango Kelbon, Blank Rome on behalf of Verizon Wireless. I wanted to start off by thanking Your Honor for times in the past which

you've allowed me to participate telephonically. It was very 2 courteous of Your Honor. But I'm glad I can finally get to meet Your Honor face to face. I really have nothing further to 4 add, but that we've worked very cooperatively with the debtors in reaching a resolution of our issues that are set forth in the stipulation.

> All right. THE COURT:

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MS. KELBON: Thank, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you very much. And the Court will approve the stipulation and approve the settlement.

Thank, Your Honor. That brings us to MR. FOLEY: Items Number 18 and 19, which is a similar motion that we were seeking relief with respect to IBM. Your Honor, in consultation with the Committee who filed an informal response -- the agenda is incorrect, it should say informal response by the Committee since this is our motion -- we have agreed to adjourn this matter until the January 29th hearing date to see if we can resolve the Committee's response to that motion.

THE COURT: All right. It will be continued to the 29th. Is that both 18 and 19, Mr. Foley?

MR. FOLEY: Well, 18 was decided for an expedited hearing, so we would ask the Court to technically grant that and then have the substantive hearing on Number 19 be heard on the 29th.

> That makes more sense. So the Court will THE COURT:

1 grant the motion for the expedited hearing in Number 18 and 2 then we'll set the hearing for the 29th of January.

MR. FOLEY: Thank, Your Honor. Your Honor, that 4 brings us to Items Number 20 and 21, which are items related to a substantive motion that will be argued later in the agenda. This is an expedited hearing request and a motion to seal a certain document by TomTom. And we have no opposition to either of the motions and we would ask the Court to grant them.

THE COURT: All right.

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MR. DESIDERIO: Chris Desiderio from Nixon Peabody on behalf of TomTom Inc.

THE COURT: Could you just state your name? worried that we didn't get it on the record.

MR. DESIDERIO: Sure, yes. Chris Desiderio.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MR. DESIDERIO: From Nixon Peabody. There have been no oppositions received, we just seek to seal the exhibits the debtor's filed.

THE COURT: So the request in Item Number 20 is for the motion to seal the exhibit and the Court will grant that. And in 21, that's to seal the other exhibits?

MR. DESIDERIO: No, actually one was just to grant an expedited hearing. We've noticed this on Wednesday, so it's only being heard on three days, I think three days notice.

> I understand, okay. So the expedited THE COURT:

1 hearing is granted and the Court will grant the relief to place the exhibit under seal.

> MR. DESIDERIO: Thank you, Your Honor.

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MR. FOLEY: Okay, that brings us to Item Number 22 on the agenda. If Your Honor recalls at the last hearing, Your Honor heard a motion to reject certain executory contracts with employees. Some of the parties received late notice and Your Honor gave them additional time to file oppositions. were three filed, one by Mr. Stacia and one by Mr. Riches and one by Ms. Cohen. And I believe their counsel are here, Your There was one gentleman, Patrick Longgood that Mr. Shai I spoke to him and concluded that he did not, he represented. decided not to file anything, but he appreciated the Court giving him additional time to do so.

THE COURT: All right, thank you, Mr. Foley.

MR. RENNIE: Frank Rennie from CowanGates Law Firm here in Richmond. Good to see you, Your Honor. I'm here on behalf of Mr. James Stacia who has filed an objection to Circuit City's motion to reject his separation agreement and release of claims that he filed that he signed with Circuit City in September of 2008. A long term employee, Your Honor, similar to the situations that you heard in last month's hearing. Sixteen-year employee, had received notice in early September that he was going to be laid off. He signed a separation agreement and release of claims, and in return

received a six-month severance package. He had one of those 2 months of the six-month severance paid and he would like to enforce the remaining five months of that severance package.

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Your Honor, unlike some of the severance packages for long term employees, this is one where I believe that there was some quid pro quo in signing the release with Circuit City. Mr. Stacia gave up rights to potentially file any claims that he may have against Circuit City for discrimination under the veterans' statutes. He's a member of the reserve component of the United States military, served in Iraq for a year, came back, resumed his employment with Circuit City, but still maintained a reserve status and was gone for weeks at a time fulfilling that reserve status. So when his employment was terminated and he signed a release, he was giving up the right to file anything that he may want to file claiming that Circuit City discriminated against him as a member of the reserve forces of the U.S. military.

So, Your Honor, under the Countryman test that was brought to the Court's attention during the last hearing, we feel like Mr. Stacia had performed his part of the bargain and had completed his part of the contract by signing that release in September, and the only party then to perform under the contract was Circuit City, and they performed one out of six months of his severance package. And we would, for that reason, say that the contract was not executory and that he had

fulfilled his part of the contract and would like for the Court 2 to reject that.

THE COURT: All right. If it's not an executory contract, doesn't that just make him a creditor of the estate? And then he would have a right to be able to file a claim against this estate.

MR. RENNIE: Yes, Your Honor.

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THE COURT: I mean, you're either one or the other. Either you're a party to an executory contract or if there's been performance, then you're a creditor. And so I think that Mr. Stacia certainly can file claims and if he has entered into a release, you may very well have arguments that if there's been a brief by the debtor, that would allow him to assert the claims and then the debtor can defend against it as the debtor sees fit, obviously. So I would certainly encourage Mr. Stacia to file his claim in the court, but if it's not an executory contract, then he would be a creditor. So in either event he gets to assert his claims in this case. Mr. Foley, do you wish 19 to be heard?

MR. FOLEY: The arguments made by Mr. Stacia are very similar to Mr. Wimmer and Mr. Leopold last time. In fact, the pleading is very similar. And as Your Honor ruled last time with respect to Mr. Miller's argument, this is an executory contract and it should be, we're seeking to reject it and the effective 365(g)(1) and 502(g)(1) is it's a pre-petition claim.

1 We're obviously not seeking to have our cake and eat it too, 2 we're not seeking to enforce any release. Whatever claims he has, he has. Whatever priority he wants to assert to have he 4 can assert them and we'll defend them in due course. But all 5 the employees of this company have gone through a lot of 6 problems and they're not over yet, and so we just, we can't treat people dissimilarly, so we think, Your Honor, that with respect to Mr. Stacia's contracts, you should grant our motion to reject them.

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THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Foley. Mr. Rennie, I am going to find that this is an executory contract, I am going to allow the debtor to reject the contract. Of course, that just gives rise to a breach and Mr. Stacia can file whatever claims that he wants, and whatever level of priority that you deem appropriate under the bankruptcy code and then we'll hear those matters at a separate time. I am sympathetic to all of the employees of this company, but I think that Mr. Foley makes the good point that everyone needs to be treated the same. 19∥you.

MR. RENNIE: Yes, Your Honor. Thank you for your time, sir.

MR. FOLEY: Your Honor, the next respondent was Mr. Jonathan Riches. I don't know if, I believe he's incarcerated so I don't know if he's represented or his -- but I'm not exactly sure, I believe his claim in his handwritten letter

says that if he objects to a settlement offer, he's a former 2 Circuit City employee of 2002 before he went to federal prison for computer fraud he worked in the electronics department and 4 is vested in 401K plan and bought stock options and he says 5 some issues about his pension. I'm not sure this is really, I 6 guess our motion was seeking to reject employment agreements, not seeking to affect his rights under a 401K plan or whether stock options have any value, whether his pension is being affected at all. None of that's being affected, so we would ask the Court to grant a motion with respect to the contract rejection aspect of the relief sought and he could reserve all rights with respect to claims or anything else with respect to 13 the claim.

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The contract rejection aspect of the THE COURT: claim will be granted and the contract will be deemed rejected.

MR. FOLEY: Your Honor, I believe that leaves the last respondent as Savitri Cohen, and I don't know if counsel is here for --

THE COURT: I think Mr. Mueller's here on behalf of 20 Ms. Cohen.

MR. MUELLER: Good morning, Your Honor. Mueller as local counsel for Mr. Cohen. Mr. Cohen's counsel in New York has asked me to tell you that they submit their objection and offer their papers to the Court. argument, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you, Mr. Mueller. The 2 Court will approve the rejection of this contract as well reserving the right of Mr. Cohen to file any claims in whatever 4 priority he deems appropriate with the Court.

MR. FOLEY: Thank, Your Honor. That brings us to Item Number 23 on the agenda which is TomTom's motion for relief from the automatic stay.

THE COURT: All right, thank you.

MR. DREBSKY: Good morning, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Good morning.

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MR. DREBSKY: Dennis Drebsky from Nixon Peabody on 12 behalf of TomTom. This motion, the facts surrounding this motion are really not in dispute. The legal result of those facts are what we're here for this morning. There is no dispute that there was a letter agreement on October 17th for the purchase of units, 125,000 TomTom units Model 125 which gave rise to a claim of somewhat over \$8.4 million. Along with that was a promotion to Circuit City that if they sold, for every unit they sold they would get a certain number of dollars back, it was Christmas type promotions that you see. And assuming, and we're assuming for the purposes of this motion that they sold all the 125,000 units, this would give them a credit of approximately \$5.4 million. What we're seeking here this morning is the right to set off the \$5.4 million credit against the \$8.4 million liability.

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The two basic arguments, and I'll get to it in a 2 moment, are, it's either an appropriate set off or recoupment. I'll take the second of those first. In one aspect of it, I 4 would only accept my colleague's argument. Their view of this transaction is that they're two separate contracts and therefore you can't have recoupment. Our view is under either test, this is an integrated contract. In fact, the letter agreement, which is attached both to our papers and to Circuit City's papers, in the purchase order, makes reference to the promotion, and it says, you get the sell through credit program and it says it's separately documented.

Clearly at the time, this was an integrated 13 transaction. You buy the stuff, whatever you sell you get X dollars back. And under the Grady test, we became obligated, and I know something about Grady having argued that, under the Grady test, once you become obligated, that's the real point, the fact that Mrs. Grady manifested her illness sometime after the petition didn't make that a post-petition obligation over the A.H. Robins Company. This was, you know, fully integrated to buy and to sell.

Interestingly, because in Paragraph 37, Circuit City says they're two separate agreements. Well, if they are two separate agreements, then quite frankly, they don't get any (indiscernible) of credit because they never signed the promotion agreement. And that was a term, that's why it was a

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separate document. You say I agree to sell these units and get it back. So if they're two separate agreements, then frankly I'm arguing against the pecuniary interest of TomTom, but 4 TomTom has always viewed with all of its vendors as this was an integrated thing. It's done very Christmas, done every, you know, at various times of the year. As such, we clearly have the right to recoupment.

Again, two separate agreements, they owe us \$8 million, we don't owe them anything. But we're not taking that view frankly, because that's not the way we've ever viewed it, we're not seeking to take advantage of that today.

Alternatively, the setoff argument, the pre-petition obligations, they clearly signed the agreement prior, we were to the extent, and we'll assume just for the moment, for the sake of argument that the promotional agreement was also in effect pre-petition. The fact that there was a condition subsequent that they had to sell the units in order to, doesn't make it a post-petition obligation, it just doesn't do it. mean, and the cases cited herein in our papers clearly show that and the test of this circuit, as well as several others are in agreement.

The kind of smokescreen, I'll just, I'm not going to repeat every argument I put in my papers, I'm sure there are other matters that are on today, is this 502 argument that there might be a preference out there, we don't know, we

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1 haven't -- so you can't grant any relief. If that were the law $2 \parallel$ that the mere allegation, not even put into papers so that it would be Rule 11 is enough, it would eviscerate the setoff 4 provisions of 553, because traditionally, you don't know when there's going to be an allegation of a preference. It can be at the end of the case, five years later, three years later in the case. You've got to have a lot more, and that's what the case is, it should be a declaratory judgment by the Court or a finding of the Court that there is preference liability here. And that's what, that's in fact what Colliers, the very section cited Circuit City says. Because otherwise, it's so open to abuse, you know, that there would never be a setoff right.

I know that, just to sum up, in the course of recoupment doesn't need this Court's permission, there is no automatic stay for recoupment, but we don't want to take any actions here that could deem later to be violative of anything. We think we have both setoff rights and recoupment rights and that an appropriate order should be granted to that effect.

> THE COURT: Thank you very much.

MR. GALARDI: Good morning, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Good morning.

MR. GALARDI: For the record, Gregg Galardi on behalf of the Circuit City debtors. Your Honor, I'd like to start in response at the end. First, if it is a recoupment, as I think the gentleman just mentioned, he does not need an order.

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thinks it's recoupment, he doesn't have to come into the Court $2 \parallel$ and get an order. And frankly, on a preliminary motion for a lift stay, where I will list some disputed or questionable facts, it's not appropriate to get a comfort order on a recoupment.

So I think Your Honor first has to determine whether our argument is that there is not a valid setoff is correct, because if there is a valid setoff, then he's entitled to lift Your Honor, he starts with the assumption that they stay. sold all goods. We don't know if we sold all goods. He starts with the assumption that he has an allowed claim for the amount. We don't know whether he has an allowed claim to be setoff or a claim to setoff. That's another factual issue $14 \parallel$ based on that assumption.

So, Your Honor, and he starts with the fact that it's a pre-petition contract that only earns value on a postpetition basis. So it's clear that the earning of whatever it is to setoff was a post-petition event on a pre-petition. So I don't think it is a setoff, it's a pre-petition contract with a post-petition event, we think it's a claim. Maybe it's a valid claim, who knows what claim, but it's not a setoff at all. That's why we argued recoupment. If it's recoupment, he doesn't need an order.

Now we go back to the other arguments that we made, 25 Your Honor. What we have though is we also have an executory

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contract under his interpretation. His interpretation is that 2 a pre-petition contract that gave us post-petition rights which on the petition date were there for an executory contract. 4 there is the procedural problem that we think we have in the 5 first instance, but there is no motion. Three-sixty-five with respect to executory contracts applies in the first instance and we have cited Your Honor the case law that the appropriate vehicle to proceed on this matter is first to proceed with a motion to assume or reject the contract. It's been neither assumed nor rejected nor has even moved to assume or reject.

If the contract is rejected, then there will be a damage claim and we can talk about what the valid amount of that damage claim. If the contract is assumed, then he may have a claim for the credits, or we may have a claim for the rebate. It's simply premature in this procedural history to make that determination.

Finally, Your Honor, it's again, a motion to lift stay filed as Your Honor granted 20 and 21 on an expedited They clearly received pre-petition amounts. To set off against a pre-petition claim, you have to have an allowed pre-petition claim. We believe they have preferences. We have not taken the time yet to file a complaint. We have not even taken time to file an objection. But the supreme court has said, and if you look at Section 502(d) that if you file an objection he doesn't have an allowed claim and there's a

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dispute with respect to Courts and Your Honor will see numerous 2 of these, that if you have an objection and you validly pled it, the claim is neither allowed nor disallowed until such time 4 as the Court rules on that preference.

So, Your Honor, it seems first, premature to go forward on this matter. Two, there is evidentiary issues. Three, if he's very comfortable with his recoupment, he needs no order. And the Court should not enter an abundance of caution order that could prejudice our rights on the money. And four, Your Honor, we think we would be deprived because you're essentially saying there's an allowed claim on an assumed amount that could be recouped for all time, and that can have prejudicial effects on our 503(d) argument. So we would at least say, Your Honor, that there is no basis on this preliminary transcript to grant the relief. If they want to schedule it for an evidentiary hearing on the lift stay, we're prepared to do that. But in any event, we think on a procedural matter, the proper course for him to proceed on is to seek to assume or reject the contract, because I don't think the facts, even as he set them forth, show anything other than this was an executory contract on the petition date. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Galardi. Mr. Drebsky, do THE COURT: 24 you wish to reply?

MR. DREBSKY: Yes, just briefly. First, as to the

amount we'll call the give give --

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THE COURT: Why isn't this an executory contract?

MR. DREBSKY: Because it's been fully performed.

THE COURT: But there's still performance that may or $5 \parallel$ may not be going on now as they still sell your units if they 6 have not all been sold.

MR. DREBSKY: We've given them, no, the 5.4 is the We've assumed that, we've given them credit for every maximum. unit. We've assumed that the --

THE COURT: You've assumed that the contract's been fully performed, but the debtor could be still performing.

MR. DREBSKY: If the debtor hasn't sold the units, then the 5.4 would be less than -- we've given them that assumption. That's it. You know, we assume that during the Christmastime you've sold 125,000 units. So they're getting the full benefit, assuming that there is a give-give here, of the give-give program. What we're seeking is that we have the right to setoff, the 8.4 which is a contract amount.

> THE COURT: Right.

MR. DREBSKY: Against that under either theory that we've put forward. There's no, you know, this is smoke and mirrors to delay. We want to make sure that they don't get a windfall here. We want, we have fully performed this agreement, we shipped the goods, we've given them full credit for the give-give program. This is an accounting, that's all,

we're not talking, no party has to do anything that changed
money here. That's all. And that's not an executory contract.

It's just the payment of money, or the reconciling, if you
will, of debts against credits. I mean, accounting 101, that's
all that's left and that doesn't make it executory.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you. The Court's going to set this down for a final hearing. I do think we need to have evidence on a number of these points, and I'll set the final hearing for the, February 13th is one of our omnibus dates? We'll set it down for February 13 and I'll hear evidence on this at that time and make a ruling on that day.

MR. DREBSKY: Okay. And I guess what we'll try to do before them is stipulate to the facts that we can stipulate to so --

THE COURT: Obviously as many facts as you can stipulate to, the Court would welcome that.

MR. DREBSKY: Yes, because I think 90 percent of, at least, we can stipulate to.

THE COURT: Very good. Thank you, Mr. Drebsky.

MR. DREBSKY: Thank you very much.

MR. GALARDI: And, Your Honor, I seem to remember a section of the Bankruptcy Code that the final hearing has to be within 30 days. To the extent that this is not within that 30 days, we'll concede an extension.

THE COURT: I'm extending the stay.

MR. GALARDI: Thank you.

MR. DREBSKY: Yes. No problem with that.

MR. FOLEY: Your Honor, the next matter on the agenda, I believe, is Number 24, which is the motion to terminate the stay by Engineered Construction.

MR. PETCHER: Good morning, Your Honor. Rhett

Petcher from Seyfarth Shaw on behalf of Engineered Structures

Inc. Your Honor, we're here today with respect to ESI's motion

for relief from stay to allow prosecution of the statutory

mechanics' liens, foreclosure actions and then subsequent

foreclosure on the real property.

ESI is a general contractor that provided goods and services to Circuit City in connection with new construction and remodeling at four sites, Store Number 3878 in Brea, California, Store Number 4313 in LaHabra, California, Store Number 3745 in Santa Clarita, and Store Number 3396 in Palm Desert. It's our understanding, Your Honor, that Circuit City is not opposing our motion with respect to the last two stores I listed because they've been closed and the leases have been rejected. It's my understanding that they have indicated they will work with us for a stipulated order which we'll then present to the Court.

With that in mind, Your Honor, I'm just going to focus today on the two stores which I'll call the going forward stores, where Circuit City has indicated they at least have not

yet decided whether to assume or reject the leases.

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Your Honor, the liens came about as a result of contracts that were signed to remodel the relevant properties in February of 2008. The premium notices were served on April $5\parallel$ of 2008 and then as of the petition date, ESI was owed on the 6 Brea property, approximately \$119,000 and on the LaHabra property, approximately \$247,000. ESI filed its claim of lien on the Brea property on November 10th, which is the petition date and would need to foreclose on pursuant to California law by not later than February 6th. With respect to the LaHabra property, the lien was, the claim of lien was filed on November 12th.

With respect to the timing of those liens, under California code and the Bankruptcy Code, it's California Code Section 3134 and Bankruptcy Code Sections 362 and 546. liens relate back to the start of work and so should be treated as perfected despite the fact they were filed post-petition.

I think, Your Honor, based on my understanding of Circuit City's objection to our motion that the issue really comes down to whether or not there is cause for relief from the stay with respect to these two properties and whether the balance of prejudice weighs in favor of ESI or Circuit City. We acknowledge, Your Honor, that the burden is initially on ESI as the movant to establish that we have cause from relief from the stay and that the burden then shifts to Circuit City to

rebut any finding of cause.

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Under In re Borage, which is out of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania and as supported by -- I apologize, Your Honor -- as supported by <u>In re Robins</u> of the Fourth 5 Circuit, essentially the duty of the Court is to balance the potential prejudice of the bankruptcy estate versus the hardships that ESI may suffer if the stay is not lifted and grant relief on that basis. This Court has indicated in the In re Robinson case that there are usually about four factors that are considered in this, including whether the issues relating to the action that is stayed are state law versus bankruptcy issues or that modifying the stay will promote judicial economy, whether the bankruptcy case will be disrupted in the event that the stay is not lifted, and then finally whether the estate will be prejudiced as it relates to, as compared to the movant.

Your Honor, here I think the balance of harm weighs 18 heavily in favor of ESI. First, Your Honor, as Circuit City has pointed out, there are two separate interests that the lien has been placed on. The first is the fee simple interest of the landlord, which is not subject to the bankruptcy estate, and the second is the lease hold interest of Circuit City with respect to its interest, its own interest in the property. acknowledge that that's a property right that they have in these properties. And the problem, Your Honor, is that the

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stay doesn't apply as to the running of the statute of $2 \parallel 1$ limitations for the fee simple interest of the landlords. And so ESI is forced to move forward with respect to any 4 foreclosure proceeding despite the fact that it is not allowed to do so with respect to the lease hold interest.

This is problematic for a couple of reasons, Your Honor. First, Circuit City, first, Your Honor, the uneven application is going to result in, potentially result in ESI forfeiting some of the value of this lien because it's moving forward on a foreclosure on a partial basis, and under California law that could be problematic in that it could forfeit the remaining value of its lien to the extent that it doesn't move forward and foreclose on all of the interest at 14 the same time.

Second, Your Honor, even if the interest isn't extinguished, Circuit City's interest wasn't extinguished, it would result in piecemeal litigation for ESI, because we would 18 first have to litigate, liquidate, litigate and foreclose upon the fee simple interests and then would have to come back and re-litigate those issues, those identical issues again against Circuit City at a later date. This is going to cause multiple actions on the same issues and is going to result in duplicative litigation.

Additionally, Your Honor, ESI will be subject to 25 continued claims of the subcontractors to the extent it's not

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allowed to continue pursuing these litigations. 2 submitted an affidavit that shows that there have been a number of subcontractors who have made claims directly against ESI as $4 \parallel$ opposed to the bankruptcy estate. These are claims that would $5 \parallel$ normally need to be paid out of the monies due to ESI from the estate and the stay has placed ESI in a position where they would, as the claims continue to come in, would need to be paying the bankruptcy estate's obligations out of their own money because the stay is currently in place as to these foreclosure proceedings.

Finally, Your Honor, we believe that this could 12∥actually result in a net positive for the bankruptcy estate to the extent that these actions are allowed to go forward together, you can see a situation where the landlord satisfies these obligations which would essentially eliminate some of these claims from the need for the estate to ultimately satisfy them.

Finally, Your Honor, it's our belief that Circuit 19 City has not yet made any sufficient allegation relating to their own prejudice. They've raised two primary issues. One of them is that the foreclosure actions would harm the negotiations with the owners of the properties as they're negotiating these, renegotiating some of these leases. Honor, frankly, they're going to need to, if they're going to assume these leases, they're going to need to sure any liens or

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any other deficiencies here which means that this is part of 2 those negotiations whether the foreclosure action is proceeding or not.

Second, Your Honor, they argue that the lien could 5 hurt their operation of the stores. However, this is an in rem 6 proceeding, it's against the property itself. It wouldn't affect their ability to continue to operate those stores until such relief was granted. Even then there's numerous ways to resolve this that involve non-estate property which could ultimately result in a resolution without affecting their ability to continue operations of these stores.

THE COURT: These leases, the debtor has a very short 13 time within which it has to make a decision whether it's going to assume or reject these leases, and that time is fast approaching in this case. If we didn't grant your motion until that time so the debtor had an opportunity to fully analyze its situation, what is the prejudice to you by delaying it for just 18 that period of time?

MR. PETCHER: Your Honor, I believe that the prejudice there is the fact that the lease rejection dates happen after the statutory period for foreclosing upon these liens and the prejudice the prejudice then at that point would result from the fact that these liens would expire as to, if we were required to do them piecemeal, in other words, we would have to move forward against the landlord themselves and

1 potentially extinguish the, in that foreclosure proceeding, 2 potentially extinguish our rights to recover against the Circuit City portion of the lien.

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THE COURT: And if you're stayed by this Court, you 5∥ would still lose your right under California law to pursue your 6 mechanics' lien?

MR. PETCHER: Your Honor, there's some concern about, the concern is the all or nothing approach. There's some --

THE COURT: It's the piecemeal aspect of it that 10 you're worried about.

MR. PETCHER: It's the piecemeal aspect of it which 12∥we're worried about and it's not completely clear, Your Honor, 13 that we would not lose that. There's certainly arguments on 14 both sides there, Your Honor, but we're concerned about that. But we're also concerned about the piecemeal aspect. I mean, the prejudice is also the fact that this litigation would have to happen twice when it could very easily happen once. 18 state law action which is something that again is supposed to weigh in favor of lifting the stay. And based on those, those are the two primary issues that with respect to the prejudice there.

THE COURT: And what do you have to do under California law to perfect your lien or to go forward with it as this point? In Virginia we have to file a lawsuit within a certain period of time. Is that what you have to do in

California?

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MR. PETCHER: I believe that is correct, Your Honor, yes.

THE COURT: And what if I was to grant you limited 5 relief to allow you to file your lawsuit, but not to pursue it until such time as the debtor makes a decision about whether it's going to assume or reject the contract.

MR. PETCHER: Your Honor, to be perfectly honest, I can't answer that question today. I am not sure if just initiating a lawsuit, I believe that the law is the same, but I cannot with certainty state that to you today.

THE COURT: All right, thank you. Let me hear from 13 Mr. Galardi.

MR. GALARDI: Your Honor, now I'm to the place that I think we were going to suggest, Your Honor. One, we have a hearing, I think it's January 29th. We're concerned about two aspects. One is if there's a foreclosure to be dispossessed and then the landlord also seeking claims against us as an administrative expense where this in our view is a pre-petition expense even it's an obligation under the lease. Two is that we haven't actually had the opportunity to review the lease to see if such a foreclosure action is a grounds to have us taken out of the property. What I was going to suggest, since I understand that there's a February 6th date, was to simply move this over. Again, we would have no problem if all they had to

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do was file a complaint and stay that action until the decision to assume or reject these leases is determined.

THE COURT: That's how we handle it in Virginia.

MR. GALARDI: And so we would be perfectly fine with that. And if they had to actually pursue it, I think we could work out something so long as we don't get dispossessed until we make a decision and as long as there's no claims against us or no expenses incurred by us, then I think we can work that through, I think that so as a preliminary matter, what I'd ask is to move it over to the 29th to try to work exactly on that stipulation. No time period would run by that time period. Then we can see if we can do a stipulation where they can file a complaint, familiarize ourselves with what other steps have to do the lease. And I don't think there's any prejudice because the date that seems to be driving this is, again, the February 6th date, and we have a hearing before then.

THE COURT: All right. That's what the Court's going I'm going to set it down for a final hearing on the 18 to do. 29th of this month and I would encourage counsel to get together and see if you can fashion some limited relief that would allow you not to be prejudice on your claim. quite normal in mechanics' lien situations, at least in this state and states around here. We can fashion the same relief under California law. That would be the Court's hope.

MR. PETCHER: Your Honor, may I approach?

THE COURT: Yes, you may.

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MR. PETCHER: One other thing, Your Honor, I just want to seek permission from the Court to also, to submit a separate order with respect to the two of the closed stores. The reason for that is there are actual litigation filed against ESI and we'd like to go ahead and get that moving forward more quickly.

THE COURT: And that one I understand, there's no objection and the Court will grant that relief.

MR. GALARDI: That's correct, Your Honor. rejected those leases.

MR. PETCHER: Thank you, Your Honor. We'll submit an 13 order.

> Ms. Hudson. THE COURT: Okay.

MS. HUDSON: Your Honor, are we on Number 25?

THE COURT: We're just about to be on 25.

MS. HUDSON: Okay. Lisa Hudson here on behalf of North Plainfield VF LLC and Marlton VF LLC here on the motion to compel debtor's performance with post-petition obligations under 365(d)(3), another mechanics' lien issue, Your Honor. filed this motion to compel on behalf of two New Jersey stores, North Plainfield and Marlton, and it involves post-petition obligations that are not limited to rent, rent for December and January, but also a mechanics' liens, to remove those liens that exist and to keep the property free and clear of liens.

We're looking at approximately 1.7 million in liens with 2 respect to those two stores in New Jersey, Your Honor, and also the post-petition rents in the amount of \$173,000 approximately.

As Your Honor may recall, you entered after first --Is this stub rent or is this other kind THE COURT: of rent?

MS. HUDSON: This is other rent, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.

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MS. HUDSON: With respect to first day motions, Your Honor entered an order that allowed debtors to satisfy liens to prevent contractors from walking off job and refusing further services and to prevent jeopardizing relationships with landlords. So we have that order in place, and I don't believe from reading Mr. Foley's response, that there are any facts in dispute, but it is going to come down to mechanics lien law in here, New Jersey. So we have Store 4142 at issue and Store 4133, and there were approximately a million dollars in mechanics lien leases at the time we filed this motion.

Since we filed Schimenti, I believe I'm pronouncing it correctly, on January 8th or 9th also filed theirs for an excess of 600,000. So we're just over 1.7 million now for those two stores. And as I spoke before, we're seeking relief under 365(d)(3) to perform all post-petition obligations under the lease which not be limited just to rent. And where we come

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into play with all obligations is citing at least the Genex 2 case of the District of Maryland that says things like in enumeration, utilities, CAM, rent, attorneys fees, all of those things are loaded into all post-petition obligations, not just rent. And then --

The claim was, the mechanics' lien claim THE COURT: was asserted post-petition, but did the claim arise post-petition?

MS. HUDSON: Were it performed pre-petition, Your Honor, filed post-petition and the actual leases at issue here for both of those are identical because they're under the same landlord group and that's another kind of layer here, because Paragraph 13 of those leases say that the landlord and the tenant are going to covenant, that if there are any liens there that they will be removed and that that will be done within 30 days after receipt of written notice. So there's another layer, if you will, of analysis here that an obligation arises at the time the debtor's given notice, and those notices all occurred post-petition as well. So --

THE COURT: But if I compel the debtor to do this, I would be compelling the debtor to be paying a pre-petition obligation?

MS. HUDSON: Well, the facts are a little bit, the facts further enumerate a different result, I think, Your With respect to the first property in Marlton, there

1 was five liens and then with respect to the second one, there 2 was a Maglio lien and that's since been discharged after we filed the motion by Maglio. And then there was the Schimenti 4 lien that added onto North Plainfield. But debtor's papers say 5 that if they record it post-petition, that that is a violation of the stay and it's void ab initio. Well, we're not going to obviously argue if those liens are void ab initio to the extent that the debtors have no obligation so long as that relief also protects us. The problem here is the one lien, Train, in the Marlton property was pre-petition work and recorded pre-petition, but because I had explained to you that Paragraph 13 in the lease says the debtor's obligation arises at the time they get that 30 days notice, that occurred post-petition.

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So it's our argument that under 365(d), to the extent that any of those liens are not bound to, are not void ab initio by the violation of the automatic stay, namely the Train, that that lease provision is an overlap and that 30-day notice requires that to be characterized as a post-petition obligation and 365(d) would pick up there. So we would like relief for them to be compelled to remove that lien and for us to have an administrative expense claim. And if this Court would not grant that relief, that we would reserve the right to later, in State court remedies and mechanics liens laws under New Jersey contest that and be indemnified for having to remove

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THE COURT: Let me ask you the same question I asked Mr. Petcher that was here just a moment ago and arguing about 4 the California Mechanics' lien laws -- excuse me just a minute. $5 \parallel$ Would all the parties on the phone please set your phones to 6 mute -- I'm sorry, Ms. Hudson. And that question is, why don't we set this over until such time as the debtor is going to have to make their determination whether to assume your lease or reject it, because if they're going to, if they decide to assume the lease, then they're going to be have to, this would be one of the cure components of their obligation to enable them to assume the lease.

MS. HUDSON: Well, Your Honor, I guess in one instance, I mean we have the rents of \$173,000 compounding and even post-petition we have more of these liens globbing onto the process. They're enjoying the benefit of the space and time is money and the landlord is prejudiced. But secondly, one of our leases, North Plainfield, is up today later on the agenda in the docket of the Court for rejection. So absolutely up to the point of rejection, if this Court were to enter that order today, hopefully that time line wouldn't be nunc pro tunc or retroactive or anything, we need that relief with respect to that property immediately. For Marlton, arguably, Your Honor, relief as quickly as possible would be acceptable. But for North Plainfield, we have a pending motion to reject.

THE COURT: All right, thank you.

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MS. ELGIE: Good morning, Your Honor. Tara Elgie here on behalf of Schimenti Construction Company. Also on the phone are Peter Strniste and Patrick Birney, motions for 5 appearance pro hac vice have been filed for them. has joined in the North Plainfield motion. We did file one of the liens. We would distinguish what the debtor argued with respect to the void ab initio argument for a post-petition liens, because what we did was file the lien against the ground lease and the land only. This does not affect the debtor's property. But we would join in the motion to have the 365(d)(3) obligations paid.

THE COURT: All right, thank you. Anybody else? All right, Mr. Galardi, you wish to respond?

MR. GALARDI: Your Honor, first let me take the 16 construction company's lien. I think it's the same situation that we have just dealt with. If it's only an against the ground lease and it doesn't affect the foreclosure, I have no objection to that. I don't know, and there is case law that says even if you go even against the ground lease, as the gentleman acknowledges, that can be an actual violation of the stay because it could have an effect on our possessory right with respect to the property. So I would suggest that we resolve that one on a separate lift stay at some point when they do it and we reserve all our rights with respect to the

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construction company.

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Your Honor, I think it's uncontested, and I think this actually goes back to the billing date and accrual approach, because, and it's complicated by a lien approach. $5 \parallel \text{Basically I think all of the work was done pre-petition.}$ contract says, let's assume the contract says it's due 30 days when the lien arises. But it's still just very much like the taxes that arisen pre-petition or anything else. Under the accrual method, they're trying to squeeze a 365(d)(3) billing date approach to get us to pay these liens. That's not how the law works under the accrual method. If the work was done pre-petition, even if was a payment obligation under this, the accrual method says these are the obligations that arose during that period of time that had to arise after the case.

So we would argue that, first, Your Honor, that these bills, as she admits are pre-petition obligations, so even if they come under the timely payment 30 days later or 40 days later, it's only for that which is post-petition, so we would suggest, Your Honor, it's really a cure issue as Your Honor has pointed out.

Your Honor, also, again, just because the liens relate back, the only reason the perfection happens is the liens relate back to the post-petition. So again, it's pre-petition claims, but they're being elevated. We don't think it's a 365(d)(3) obligation under the accrual method.

1 think one even is in the stub rent period. So it's again, goes 2 to the reconsideration motion even if it was perfected and even due, it's probably in that stub rent period as I recall, and we 4 would argue that that's not necessarily payable at this 5 particular time. So, Your Honor, we would ask that Your Honor 6 not grant the motion to have us pay these at this time. this way of either assumption or rejection under the accrual method and under the, that these are simply pre-petition obligations that the landlord is trying to elevate to a post-petition obligation. But all rights reserved, if it's a post-petition obligation, then it's simply an accrual issue or it's an administrative expense, perhaps, in the stub rent 13 period.

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THE COURT: Thank you, sir. Ms. Hudson, do you wish to reply?

MS. HUDSON: Your Honor, only with respect to a clarification under the lease. It says it better than I could. In Paragraph 13 on this issue of the notice period, it says expressly that should a lien be filed, the party whose nonpayment of the contract or causes the lien to be filed shall within 30 days after receipt of written notice of the lien cause it to be removed. So we admit for the Train lien that it was pre-petition work and it was recorded pre-petition, but that notice, all of it occurred unarguably and undisputedly post-petition and that notice is when the obligation arose by

the parties in the contracting language.

THE COURT: I understand that. But speak to Mr. Galardi's argument about the accrual method and the way that we do that as opposed to the billing method. I mean, I understand that the obligation said it was to be paid at that particular time. But the debt accrued pre-petition.

MS. HUDSON: That's ignoring New Jersey Mechanics

Lien Law. All the case law on bankruptcy says you look to the underlying state law, and New Jersey is not a lease like

Virginia or Arizona, in New Jersey it's at the time of recording, it's at the time of perfection. When the work is performed is irrelevant. It is not a relation back state.

Because New Jersey is different, their Designer Doors case in Arizona is inapposite. Designer Doors is an Arizona/Virginia case that says you do relate back. But New Jersey is not a relate back, it is at the time that that lien is recorded or perfected and filed. It is not at the time that the underlying work was performed.

THE COURT: Then it would be a post-petition matter that would be stayed by the automatic stay.

MS. HUDSON: Void ab initio. Yes, Your Honor. So it would not be an obligation with respect to the debtors, and we'd like that relief to apply to us as well.

THE COURT: Is that what your motion says?

MS. HUDSON: Our motion says to the extent that any

1 of these obligations are found to exist, that we would like the 2 debtors to be compelled under 365(d)(3), and then their reply stated argument about the void ab initio under the automatic 4 stay, and we just join in that relief, and to the extent that any are found not void ab initio, just echo our 365(d)(3) argument.

THE COURT: All right, thank you.

Your Honor, may I just add something? MR. GALARDI:

THE COURT: Yes.

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MR. GALARDI: I'm going to try to -- with respect to, and we've cited a case, with respect to the landlord and us, our argument is essentially it's not a 365(d)(3) timely payment obligation which is why we get treated differently than the landlord. We're not trying to superceded New Jersey lien law. New Jersey lien law applies to, between the two parties behind me, the lien arises against the owner of the property at that time. So I think the stay only applies to us. Obviously third parties don't get the stay, and our argument is essentially, this shows it's not a 365(d)(3) timely payment obligation under the accrual method. And I think that's how we've tried to simplify the analysis.

> Thank you. THE COURT:

MS. HUDSON: Your Honor, I just have one point of follow up. With respect to the question of whether these are all pre-petition obligations, factually I'm not sure with

1 respect to all of the Schimenti claims. However, I would point 2 out that some of the matters at issue are retainage, and that's not property of the estate either, Your Honor. So we would 4 argue that that affects the analysis. Furthermore, I think 5 there was a comment made about the Maglio lien. While that lien was released, it's actually subsequently been re-filed, and that is subsumed within the Schimenti lien.

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THE COURT: All right. Well, don't I have to analyze your claim in the context of a motion for relief from stay as opposed to a joinder in the debtor's motion to compel payment?

MS. HUDSON: Well, Your Honor, you know, we certainly 12 join in the motion, we can bring a subsequent motion for relief from stay if Your Honor thinks that that would allow you to resolve the lien specific issues.

THE COURT: Well I'm not telling you how to practice, I'm just saying that I think that the kind of relief that you're asking for is more appropriate in that kind of a context. The motion as I understand that before me is a motion to compel the debtors to perform a specific provision under a lease.

MS. HUDSON: And we would join in that, Your Honor. Thank you.

Okay, thank you. All right. Any other THE COURT: party wish to be heard? All right, Ms. Hudson, I'm going to deny your motion to compel. I think that for reasons that Mr.

Galardi just stated, I don't think that the stay extends to the landlord, it's for the benefit of the debtor. And to the extent that it was a pre-petition obligation, the accrual method would not obligate the debtors to make the payment.

HUDSON: Your Honor, can we ask that proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law be prepared?

THE COURT: Yes. Mr. Galardi, if you could submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law for the Court's consideration. And, Ms. Hudson, you can submit your own as well.

> Thank, Your Honor. MS. HUDSON:

12 MR. GALARDI: Your Honor, when would you like those, 13 Your Honor? Ten days?

> THE COURT: Ten days.

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MR. GALARDI: Thank you.

Good morning again, Your Honor. Jeff MR. POMERANTZ: Pomerantz from Pachulski, Stang, Ziehl and Jones on behalf of the Creditors' Committee. Item 26 on Your Honor's agenda is the Creditors' Committee's application to employ Protiviti as financial advisor. At the time that the agenda was prepared there were discussions going on between the debtor and the Committee which have been resolved and we have BOP'd the order on that application.

THE COURT: I saw the order there, I was wondering if 25 that had been resolved. So that order will be entered.

wish to be heard on that?

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MR. GALARDI: Your Honor, yes. That's been resolved.

I just, when we get to the next financial advisor, one of our concerns was two financial advisors given subsequent events, I just wanted to put that on the record when we get.

THE COURT: All right, thank you, sir. All right. So the application to employ Protiviti will be approved.

MR. POMERANTZ: Your Honor, Item Number 27 on Your Honor's agenda is the Committee's application to employ Jeffries and Company as the Committee's investment banker and financial advisor. We've had discussions with the debtor with respect to the Committee's retention of Jeffries. I believe in concept the debtor had no opposition to the Committee's retention of Jeffries and we've worked out the compensation arrangements which turned on the application of the transaction fee provided in there, and that has been resolved. I think we've also resolved that the Committee should be authorized to employ Jeffries through the, at least the end of the month, and we have an order that has circulated that would involve the Committee's application being granted, Jeffries being employed through the end of the month on the transaction fee schedule that is contained in that order.

Mr. Galardi raised to the Committee several days ago the concern that depending upon the outcome of his case, it may be that Jeffries' employment should not continue beyond a

certain period of time and that the Committee should not have 2 two financial advisors. The Committee is very mindful of it's duty to only employ financial advisors and professionals that 4 make sense and to keep costs down and given the uncertainty, 5 though, surrounding the case the last couple of weeks we believe that the best approach was to continue to January 29th solely the issue of the extent to which Jeffries would be continued to be employed after that period of time. Committee will consider that issue in light of events how they've turned out the last few days. We'll meet and hopefully we'll reach a resolution with the Debtor. If for some reason we can't reach a resolution we would be back here, Your Honor, on January 29th arguing the continued employment which may contain modified terms based upon changed circumstances.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

MR. POMERANTZ: Thank you.

THE COURT: Mr. Galardi?

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MR. GALARDI: Your Honor, Mr. Pomerantz has described 19 \parallel the discussion. As yesterday was the sale transaction day and we hope to approve a transaction, we would be attaining the position as with our own financial advisors that investment bankers are probably no longer necessary after the end of the month and that's really the reason I rose both with respect to productivity and Jeffries I think we'll be down to one and we think they should be down to one so to speak by that time.

1 But, let's see how the facts and circumstances go and we've $2 \parallel$ agreed to adjourn that particular issue until the 29th.

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THE COURT: Thank you, sir. And, so as I understand it then I'm going to approve the employment of January and then we'll consider on the 29th of this month the role of this 6 professional going forward past January?

MR. GALARDI: Yes, Your Honor, you'll approve it through January. They were hired immediately after the appointment of the Committee in November, so it would be November through January. Your Honor would also be approving the transaction fee as agreed to by the Debtor and the Committee with the sole issue remaining is the continued employment if, in fact, that is something that Your Honor needs to address that can't be resolved.

THE COURT: Thank you. That will be approved.

MR. GALARDI: Thank you, Your Honor. Item Number 28 on Your Honor's agenda is the Committee's application to employ 18∥ the law firm of Gowling, Lafleur, Henderson as Canadian counsel. As Your Honor is aware there's a Canadian proceeding pending in Canada and the Committee had believed it necessary to retain counsel. Initially, there was an objection by the Debtor to the Committee's authority and appropriateness of them retaining Canadian counsel. We have since resolved that and that order has been BOP'd to Your Honor.

THE COURT: And that will be approved.

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MR. GALARDI: Thank you, Your Honor. Your Honor, I think we go to the jury box for Number 29 if I'm not mistaken. I think it's the landlord's motion for rehearing and reconsideration.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

MR. EPPS: Good afternoon, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Good afternoon, Mr. Epps.

MR. EPPS: A.C. Epps, Jr. on behalf of the landlord's who have filed Docket Number 1347, also clients who our firm have joined in docket Numbers 1363 and 1375. There are other landlords represented by other counsel who have also joined, 12 but those are our three items.

Your Honor, I appear fairly certain that the Court felt that it had dispensed with me once before on this issue and for that I apologize, but I'm afraid it hasn't and I'd like to explain why we're back in the procedure which we're back in if you don't mind. The Court may recall that we've brought this motion --- these various motions for a payment and they were in front of the Court originally on its docket for the 5th of December which was, in fact, the first Omnibus hearing in this case.

UNIDENTIFIED ATTORNEY: Your Honor?

MR. EPPS: This --

UNIDENTIFIED ATTORNEY: Excuse me.

Is there someone on the phone who wishes THE COURT:

to speak?

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UNIDENTIFIED ATTORNEY: I'm sorry. I think that I just -- somebody has obviously put the call on hold and I could not hear the Court through the classical music playing. just went off.

UNIDENTIFIED ATTORNEY: No, it's still on.

UNIDENTIFIED ATTORNEY: It is, Your Honor, if you --

UNIDENTIFIED ATTORNEY: Could everyone just hang up and call back in so we can lose whoever is not on the phone and we could hear the hearing?

THE COURT: I think in light of the circumstances 12∥ that makes good sense. If everyone would please --

UNIDENTIFIED ATTORNEY: And hopefully -- or could you disconnect -- you might have to disconnect that person somehow after we've all hung up and called back in like five minutes.

THE COURT: I can do a lot of things, but I don't know if I can disconnect --

18 (Laughter)

MR. CLARK: My name is John Clark. I just talked to technical services. They're looking into it and they're going to try and disconnect that person.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. And then I would ask everyone else to please just be patient and -- until we can get that done and then set your phone to mute. Thank you.

UNIDENTIFIED ATTORNEY: Okay.

UNIDENTIFIED ATTORNEY: Thank Your Honor 1 2 UNIDENTIFIED ATTORNEY: Your Honor, would you like to 3 wait for five minutes or should we proceed? 4 UNIDENTIFIED ATTORNEY: It sounds like they got it 5 done. THE COURT: I think that --6 7 UNIDENTIFIED ATTORNEY: Your Honor, it appears to have cleared up. 8 9 THE COURT: All right. Thank you. 10 UNIDENTIFIED ATTORNEY: I was just telling this person who just got back from being on hold you had music 11 12 playing. 13 MR. EPPS: In any case, Your Honor, we were here on 14 the 5th of December which was the first Omnibus hearing -- the first hearing other than the first day hearings. Discussions 16 with Mr. Galardi on that day resulted in an agreed postponement 17 of the hearing until the 22nd with our treating it as though 18 you were hearing it on the 1st for the promptness question 19 purposes. At the hearing on the 22nd, the Court heard me out. 20 It then decided that it was not going to order the Court to make -- order the Debtors to make the payments that we had 22

J&J COURT TRANSCRIBERS, INC.

requested at that time. The Court's ruling on the record which

requested that the -- there would be findings and conclusions.

I will point out in a second was quite sketchy and I had

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Later in the hearing, the Court pointed out to 2 Debtors' counsel that it would like the Debtors' counsel to produce findings and conclusions. That has not happened. 4 There are no findings and conclusions submitted to the Court, 5 at least, as of ten o'clock last night. What there is is a docket entry from a day or so later from, I believe, made by Ms. Fathergill that says that you have denied our motion.

Now, personally, I am pretty comfortable that in a Fourth Circuit that doesn't have any effect. Other places in the country that may not be the case and certain of our clients who are very, very nervous about that. And, furthermore, to add confusion to the situation already somewhat confused we inferred correctly or incorrectly from something that was discussed at one point with the Debtor that perhaps the Debtor was going to take that position that our ten days had started to run.

THE COURT: For mostly an appeal?

MR. EPPS: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: That's from the date of the entry of the 20 order --

> MR. EPPS: That's my understanding, too.

THE COURT: -- and I have not entered an order.

But, we were -- that was my feeling, too. MR. EPPS:

I, certainly, did not want to be tripped up by an interim discussion on the other issue. But, at that point we still had

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no findings and, indeed, as I say we still have no findings.

Now, the case will never get appealed if we never have any findings. We did not know what --

THE COURT: Or I could authorize you to submit 5 findings.

MR. EPPS: You could, Your Honor, and I would be willing to do that. I don't know whether the Court -- the Court's oral record on this consists of about four lines of the Court's discussion which, I think, is not what either the Court or any of us want to have as our record to go up. And my main purpose to be here is if I cannot persuade the Court that it would -- made a mistake is to have something to take up because it's of particular importance to us and we do need to take it up.

THE COURT: I know you want to take it up.

MR. EPPS: And while I -- the Court is familiar with me, and knows that I believe in what I argue before the Court, and I really believe this, and I really believe that we should win, and I'm perfectly happy that we argue it today, and although I think our papers say it quite well, what I really need is a record to take it up on.

THE COURT: And the Court certainly would welcome guidance from the appellate courts, as well, on this issue. But, you know, I did find that the stub rent requests are going to be accorded priority treatment under Section 503(b)(3) and

1 that the Debtors were not obligated to pay the stub rent 2 immediately pursuant to Section 365(d)(3). That was what I held and I was following Judge Adam's <u>Track Auto</u> (phonetic) 4 case as I read that and, so it's not any mystery that's what $5 \parallel I --$ the decision that I made and I think that you are entitled to an order that says that so that you can appeal that and go up.

> Now, Mr. Galardi, maybe you can enlighten us --MR. GALARDI: Sure.

THE COURT: -- on where we are on the findings of fact and provings of law.

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MR. GALARDI: Your Honor, I will take 100 percent responsibility. I put my final comments on it on Monday, got trapped in the auction and did not circulate it. I will have it circulated before the end of today to Mr. Epps. his comments. I understood he filed it and I do apologize for that fact, but it says exactly what Your Honor just said. mystery, and we understood and another counsel took an appeal. I understand the uncertainty we were creating and I apologize.

MR. EPPS: Mr. Galardi has considerably more that I could ever get done and I certainly am not criticizing on that. I just need this issue to move along, so if the Court would ask that we exchange and try to get a unified findings and conclusions. And if we don't we'll submit our own in the same ten days that you were discussing with other people, is that

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MR. GALARDI: And that is fine, Your Honor. I -- we were, again, no excuse. We could have filed it today, but I though we'd give Mr. Epps an opportunity since he had filed the 5 reconsideration. Part of mine was a little premature since I didn't have an order. I didn't even realize there was another proposed denial. My apologies. He will have it today by five. We will have it submitted with comments or a competing order by Monday.

THE COURT: That'll be fine. Monday's a federal holiday --

MR. GALARDI: Tuesday.

THE COURT: -- so I'm told. I'm still getting used to this, too. But, so by Tuesday I would like the findings filed and then Mr. Epps, you would, certainly, have ten days from that date to file a competing version of the findings and conclusions if you wish to do so.

MR. EPPS: Your Honor, I would hope that we would have findings and conclusions would have my signature on them and we'll try to do that.

THE COURT: If they have your signature then I'll --MR. EPPS: If we -- if that doesn't happen then I'll take the ten days and I thank you.

THE COURT: You're welcome.

MR. GALARDI: Yeah, I hope so, as well, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. And, so for purposes of Item Number 29, it's denied.

MR. EPPS: Thank you.

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MR. GALARDI: Your Honor, that brings us to Matter 30 on the agenda which is the Debtors' second Omnibus motion for an order authorizing rejection of certain executory contracts. My understanding is that there are no objections to that We'd ask for an order to be entered on Item Number 30. motion.

THE COURT: That will be granted.

MR. GALARDI: Your Honor, the next matter on the agenda is the Debtors' second Omnibus objection authorizing the rejection of certain unexpired leases or non-residential real property. There are two objections. One is North Plainfield. Again, I know from the other hearing that this now motion is now up for rejection as opposed to the issue of open assumption.

And then there is the objection of Verizon Wireless. 18 I don't know if they have -- if they're opposing the objection or they want to have -- I think Plainfield wanted to have the payment of the contractor's liens. I think that issue has been dealt with and I think Verizon wanted to say something about it's property.

> All right. Very good. THE COURT:

MR. KELBON: Thank you, Mr. Galardi. Your Honor, Regina Kelbon on behalf of Verizon Wireless again. Your Honor,

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as you know we have kiosks in each of these locations. They're 2 called SWAS, store within a store, and when the Debtor closed down the first 154 stores we worked very cooperatively and we coordinated that exit very well.

However, there were like 12 store that were never open, but our kiosks were already placed in there because they were ready to be opened for the grand opening and apparently the Debtor has given the keys back to -- on four of the locations prior to our ability to get the kiosks out. So, we have just requested that the order provide that the landlords make a reasonable opportunity for us to get out -- get our 12 stuff out of their stores. We have contacted the landlords so far. We do not anticipate any problems from them. The ones we have reached out to and have made contact with have been cooperative, but we -- out of an abundance of caution just want to make sure we can get our kiosks and our property out.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

MR. KELBON: Thank you, Your Honor.

MS. HUDSON: Your Honor, Lisa Hudson, again, on behalf of North Plainfield VF, LLC. We realize Your Honor has denied our 365(d)(3) and we would just ask that any rejection not be earlier, nunc pro tunc or retroactive then the date of any order from today's hearings and that any post-petition obligations not be relieved in that order up to the time of rejection.

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THE COURT: The rejection is not going to be nunc pro tunc. Mr. Galardi, you're not asking for nunc pro tunc relief on this?

MR. GALARDI: Actually -- well, nunc pro tunc to the 5 date that we have actually surrendered the property, Your 6 Honor. We have given back the keys. We've given possession. She would like it at the order we had done that prior to the filing of the motion my understanding is, so we actually would like the date to be as of the filing of the motion as opposed to the date of the order under the idea -- and we have done this in the first day of the case that we had actually surrendered the premises, turned over the keys. I have no problem with respect to her. To the extent there's a factual issue as to whether we had actually done that and given possession for her to reserve all rights on any administrative claim, but our -- I was just trying to decrease our administrative expenses. If there was a surrender I'd like to have the date of the surrender and we can just say date of surrender with all parties reserving their rights on that date.

But, the order is always -- when Your Honor has a hearing as opposed to necessarily when we surrender the premises and we try to get out as soon as we can and surrender the keys.

> All right. THE COURT: Thank you.

MR. GOLD: Good afternoon, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Good afternoon.

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MR. GOLD: Ivan Gold of Allen Matkins for GMS Golden Valley Ranch. We're one of the construction leases that's subject to the motion located in Santa Clarita, California. just wanted to let the Court know that we started an informal dialogue after this motion was filed because it certainly -the rejection of partially completed store that was sitting vacant was not that controversial apart from the lien issue. And we've been working with the Debtor on consensual language in the order that will reserve all the respective parties' rights with respect to the liens and I think that will solve, you know, any potential problems resulting from the rejection of the leases.

It provides that, you know, this doesn't affect any defenses the Debtor or a landlord might have to a third party lien claim. The third party claimants have their rights. Mr. Galardi says everybody's rights are reserved apart from the 18 fact of rejection of these leases which, at least, returns control they can be -- the properties could be stabilized. but I did want Your Honor to know that there had been quite a bit of -- in addition to the filed rejections, quite a bit of give and take and we hope to present an order to you that resolves those issues.

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Gold. Ms. Hudson, you don't have any problem with the date of surrender being the

date for the rejection?

MS. HUDSON: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Very good, so we will put that in the order then.

MR. GOLD: Thank you, Your Honor.

MR. GALARDI: Your Honor, I guess that goes to what probably many of the people in the courtroom have waited for which is the motion of the Debtors, Number 32, to sell, substantially, all of their assets.

Your Honor, the three main management people, Mr. Marcum, Mr. Hedgebeth and Mr. Besanko are actually back at the company addressing the employees, so I'm going to take -- and many people in the courtroom think I've taken way too much liberty by testifying myself, but I will go through some facts as to how we got here just for the background because I think it is both a very sad and tragic day, actually, in Circuit City's history.

Your Honor, before we ever commenced this case Mr.

Marcum who had taken over as CEO and the testimony, I think, is in the record in parts had tried to get some support from the vendors going into the Christmas season to get vendor's support taken a trip to Korea and seen vendors. Unfortunately, he was unable to get the vendor's support pre-bankruptcy and we filed -- and I told Your Honor, at the first day which was November 10th that we were trying to build the bridge to a

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going concern transaction of some sort, that the financing that 2 I emphasized was 30 million for -- we're paying roughly 25 million for 50 million of availability to get what, I think, is 4 today the most critical date which was the January 16th And as we went through this case with respect to the DIP proceedings, Your Honor, we had had objections from the Committee with respect to the DIP that we had resolved.

And throughout this process the Debtors and the management team, in particular, have gone through extraordinary efforts to find a going concern transaction. Indeed, we had even a gentleman who had bought, substantially -- I think it's 28 percent now, of the stock of the company, Mr. Salinas, who we've been entertaining negotiations with and discussions with since the day he bought -- started to buy that stock, Rothchild, FTI, Scadon (phonetic), have been dealing with their professionals to try to get to a going concern transaction.

Your Honor may also recall that on December 22nd we settled the Committee's objection to the proposed DIP financing and, again, modified those dates to say that there had to be in some sense a determination to this case by this day whether we were going to go going concern transaction or whether we were going to end up in a full store liquidation. Your Honor, that motion and the amendment which we then unsealed after filing a sale motion, the amendment to the DIP provided that we would file a motion on January 5th which we did under seal.

unsealed it and that today would be the sale hearing.

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Your Honor, very importantly and I think it is notwithstanding the efforts of management the company has been pursuing through Rothchild through management a going concern transaction well before the case was commenced, but during the case and even as late as last night had believed that there would be some going concern transaction. I say that this is a somewhat tragic situation because I think it's brought upon by the fact that financing is in this market is extremely difficult. Retail is extremely difficult and vendor uncertainty has created much of a problem.

We had gone forward with trying to sell the business as a 500 and roughly 75 store chain. We had put up a permutation for Mr. Salinas and other bidders of a 300 to 350 store chain and we put up a permutation for a chain with respect to 180 store in the Northeast. As people who are -many of whom are in the courtroom today attended the auction that was more on-the-record/off-the-record, they could understand that it lasted -- an after consultation with the Committee and the bank we actually began the process, I think, it was Monday or Tuesday and continued that process until after midnight last night in our offices in New York trying to negotiate, essentially, two major transactions.

The first was the full store liquidation which is 25∥approximately 575 stores, a full store liquidation of the

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1 Circuit City chain. And second was one of those permutation 2 transactions which eventually because of the financing markets at best this company could afford a \$600 million facility in 4 these times which then dictated the size of the transaction as 5 I said down to 350 and down to 180.

Your Honor, we had Mr. Marcum, Mr. Besanko, there was the consumer electronics meetings in Las Vegas, I guess, it was about two weeks ago. They flew out there. They met vendors. We have letters of support from such vendors, but those letters of support are all dependant upon financing and getting a transaction. We still were running up against that January 12 16th date.

Your Honor, what we had said on the first day and I think what has come true is the following. We really need in this consumer market and in this consumer electronics and the retail you really need two things. You need an adequate DIP facility or a facility and you need adequate trade/vendor support. To their credit the banks want to put in money, except to be secure you need trade support. You need consumer credit.

To the credit of certain vendors they met with our two buyers and to the credit of our buyers at their own expense no expense reimbursements have been paid. No expense amounts have been paid. They met and they flew both from Mexico to New York to Las Vegas and then Goldgate flew from -- to Las Vegas

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1 to meet the vendors. Notwithstanding the support that they say 2 in those meetings, unfortunately, I have -- I'm, unfortunately, have to announce that we had no going concern transaction as I 4 stand here today.

Your Honor, we had though no written proposals for a going concern transaction we had hours and hours of negotiations. I would say one of the proposals did put in an indication of interest. Both of the going concern vendors needed to critical things, financing and trade support and the financing needed trade support. Your Honor, we have a Committee of 11 individuals on the Creditors' committee. Six or seven of them are trade vendors. Your Honor, notwithstanding that fact we could not muster before we went to the sale process, before we commenced this bankruptcy to convince them to take the risk and to supply us with trade credit.

Your Honor, as seeing the DIP model which assumed 18∥ that we would be able to get trade credit. And notwithstanding letters which I can't say were commitments by any vendor to supply trade credit, we could not get trade credit from a Committee that has a majority of members of trade credit. Indeed, Your Honor, we went so far as yesterday to ask for a three day extension, but in light of the fact that we had no written letter or proposal we were not granted the three day extension to adjourn this hearing to Tuesday which is the day

after the holiday.

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So, Your Honor, notwithstanding the fact that we had a vendor committee and landlords that we thought would be supportive of all of these transactions I think they just said 5∥it was now to either liquidate and realize the greatest value in their view for the unsecured creditors and opposed to extend this time deadline and give us any further time. There were discussions about putting in bridge financing. I think the request to put in bridge financing had to be at risk money and people were simply not, without vendor support, prepared to put in that trade risk money. Consequently, we were forced last evening to go to an auction with respect to the full store liquidation of the Circuit City chain.

Your Honor, we conducted that through, essentially, a four-day process. Although we started it with information we looked for full store liquidations from, essentially, two chains -- two joint ventures. One we called the Great American SV Capital Tiger Hudson. And the other we called Hilco (phonetic) Gordon Brothers. Your Honor, both of those joint ventures worked significantly over the last three to four days giving us form agency agreements. We said that those for agency agreements were unacceptable at one point because they didn't provide sufficient value. We consulted with the Committee. We consulted with the banks. We went back with a proposal. They refused to meet our proposal in this difficult

time.

We then went back with one more proposal and as a result of the back and forth negotiations in which the Committee participated, in which the banks participated, in which we shared information, we came to simply one offer from Great American and I wanted to read some of the substantial terms of that agreement.

Your Honor, for those people familiar or not familiar with an agency agreement you bid on the value of the inventory. The Great American bid or the Great American consortium has a guaranteed amount of 70.5 on the cost value of inventory. And inventory is to range somewhere we believe 1.1 billion to \$1.3 billion. Your Honor, in addition, this Great American bid met our demands for a certain part of sharing of value. In particular, and after you collect or after the estate collects the 70.5 guaranteed amount on the cost value of inventory the agent, that consortium, will receive a one percent fee.

So, then as you go through those proceeds roughly after 71.5 for those keeping the math, the proceeds in addition to that are split by the Great American bid, 70 percent to the company, 30 percent to the agent. Again, after much negotiations -- and there are persons in the courtroom that could testify, but I'll take license unless people want to make me make a proffer, the -- once they got to three percent fee they then modified their bid again to now give us 90 percent of

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the proceeds. So, after three percent which is roughly a 74.5 2 percent bid and ten percent for the estate. In exchange for all of that, Your Honor, Great American insisted for us to get 4 that form bid to be the stalking horse bid that we would agree 5 to a breakup fee of \$7.5 million.

Your Honor, after discussions, again, with the bank group, with the Committee, with the Committee's financial advisors, FTI who is represented by Mr. Cashman in the courtroom today, we ran numbers. We ran the permutations. also received a bid from the Gordon Brothers Hilco. We simply determined that this bid was far better than the other bid by tens -- at least, \$10 million. So, therefore, we accepted this bid after negotiating back and forth with respect to the breakup fee. It was higher. We asked for less. It was -- we asked for less again and we eventually agreed to the 7.5 fee given that this set such a significant floor for the estate.

Great American agreed to execute that agreement and 18 we started the auction with that as our stalking horse bid. Your Honor, we then had further discussions with Gordon Brothers and Hilco and I say we're probably at midnight last night. And after going back and forth with them they were unable to submit a topping bid on that basis. Your Honor, under those circumstances back and forth and with the Committees' advisors, the bank's counsel, myself, FTI, management's input, we believe that the highest and best offer

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1 for the assets we have as we stand here today is the full store 2 | liquidation of the Circuit City stores whereby Great American would conduct such store closings and those store closings will 4 commence tomorrow, January 17th, should Your Honor approve that 5 store closing.

Your Honor, with respect to the agency agreement it's very much like the form of the agency agreement. I think we have filed it today. We've had it in the courtroom. very much like the agency agreement we filed with respect to the 155 stores. The bid -- the sale guidelines which people are concerned about are very much the same as the sale 12∥ quidelines Your Honor has approved. Obviously, there is now 13 the use of the phrase going out of business sales.

I know already that this morning and last night counsel for the Great American Group is already been in contact with many of the landlords to resolve all of those issues. believe that these guidelines are compliant with the attorney 18 general's --

UNIDENTIFIED ATTORNEY: I'm on mute, I just can't hear anything that's being said.

THE COURT: I'm sorry. Would everybody on the phone please set there phone to mute. We're getting feedback in the courtroom. Please set your phones to mute.

UNIDENTIFIED ATTORNEY: Is there a way to identify 25 that individual and drop them as we did before?

THE COURT: Somebody's on a cell phone it sounds like.

MR. GALARDI: If you're on a car phone -- thank you.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.

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MR. GALARDI: Your Honor, going back to the agreement, again, Mr. Cashman of FTI is in the courtroom today. Mr. Cashman from a distance we -- actually, we're trying to coordinate with the bidder right now. Mr. Cashman is aware of and can testify to the back and forth, the bids, the analysis of the bids with respect to FTI and it's conduct. I know Jeffries is in the courtroom today. The counsel's in the courtroom today. It was really a professional effort to reevaluate all of these things.

The sadness is, Your Honor, I think as management sits here today and has to explain to all of the employees over the next 60 to 90 days is they were going to be let go and given WARN Act notices today. Unfortunately, there will not be a Circuit City after today and the management still believes in its heart that with some additional time there would be a going concern of 180 stores. There would be a going concern of 350 stores. I think this is simply a retailer that had a problem at the wrong time in this economy and with the wrong vendors to give the no support and they decided that they simply didn't want number two to exist any longer. It is an unfortunate circumstance, but it is a fact of this company.

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Your Honor, we would ask Your Honor and I'll let 2 people take testimony if they want with respect to the side -sale guidelines, Your Honor, as I said we believe that they are 4 consistent with what we have done before. We understand and I'll leave to Your Honor that we have not given much notice of the sale guidelines or the agency agreements. If Your Honor wanted to take a break, obviously, for people to review that. I know we've had some of the landlords -- as I called in the landlord cabal, has reviewed it. I know they may have comments. I don't know what Your Honor's preference is as to the testimony or whether we want testimony.

I think the Committee supports the entry of the agency agreement being approved immediately. unfortunately, two weeks before Super Bowl, so that also drives a lot of the decision that are made, when you can maximize value. I will say again, Your Honor, one of the bidders we had discussions and I give them much credit that they were willing to split a deal into the 200 400. Unfortunately, we just couldn't get enough trade vendor support for this proposal.

I will leave it to Your Honor how you would like to proceed, but we would ask Your Honor at the end of the hearing to enter with great reluctance the approval of the agency agreement which will have the liquidation of 567 retail stores.

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Galardi. I'd like to hear from the Committee.

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Your Honor, Joe Pomerantz from MR. POMERANTZ: 2 Pachulski, Stang, Ziehl and Jones on behalf of the Committee. It's with a deep sense of sadness that the Committee which is 4 comprised as Mr. Galardi said of trade vendors, landlords, litigation creditors appears before Your Honor seeking supporting the approval of the store closing sale. We share the Debtors' profound disappointment in the inability to consummate a transaction with a going concern buyer. It is unfortunate when a bankruptcy, especially of an iconic retailer such as Circuit City, fails and the company's thrust into liquidation with the attendant loss of jobs, trading relationships and the profound effect on this community and 13 communities through the United States.

From the commencement of the case, Your Honor, the Creditors' committee was supportive of the Debtor locating a going concern buyer for Circuit city. The Creditors' committee fought hard to obtain modification to the DIP financing that would enable the Debtors to have sufficient liquidity to seek a going concern buyer to save the company and maximize value, maximize jobs. Notwithstanding the Creditors' committee's efforts, the bank's efforts and the dedication of the Debtor, its management and professionals, there were several factors that ultimately led to the Debtors' failure.

First, Your Honor, the company's spiraling sales and 25 deteriorating financial performance resulted in the Debtors'

experiencing massive losses especially since the filing date that the Debtors could not recover from. Same store sale plummeted over 33 percent from last year and the Debtors, despite their best efforts, consistently failed during the post-petition period to meet the projections.

Second, as Your Honor's fully aware the world wide recession, continuing softness in retail sector, especially in high end discretionary items such as electronics, the lack of any stability in the credit markets and the short term economic outlook foreshadowed bleak results for the company as it desperately tried to restructure its operations. Against this backdrop and hundreds of millions of dollars of pre-filing trade to (indiscernible) losses the trade creditors were generally reluctant to extent credit unless and until the Debtors could stabilize their operations and demonstrate to the Committee that the company was a viable and continuing enterprise.

The trade creditors were experiencing and are experiencing challenges of their own. As a result of the world wide recession and the pressures in their company and that made these Creditors cautious in willing to put out more trade credit. As a result of the foregoing events that were developing during the first six weeks of the case, finally in December all constituents, the Debtors, the banks, the Creditors' committee agreed that it is prudent in the exercise

of their respective fiduciary duties to their clients to $2 \parallel$ accelerate the process by which the Debtors would attempt to attract new capital or a going concern buyer.

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From the outset of the case the Committee offered its services of its legal, financial advisory and investment banking professionals to the Debtors in any way possible in efforts to avoid a total liquidation of the chain. To that end, Jeffries offered the Debtors approximately 100 suggestions of additional parties that Rothchild might contact to see if they might be willing to buy the whole chain, to buy pieces.

The professionals stayed in close contact with the 12 Debtors' professionals throughout the process offering input and advice of what progress the Committee needed to see in order to support the process and what concerns the Committee had with the business, with the process to enable it to support a going concern bid. Notwithstanding these efforts and based upon a variety of factors, potential white knights began to pull out of the process thereby reducing the Debtors' chances of a going concern sale. The reasons often cited for the deteriorating financial performance, the lack of financing and the challenging economy.

As the case progressed to early January, the Debtors' options to choosing the going concern sale were essentially narrowed to two parties as Mr. Galardi mentioned, one, the Salinas Group, a strategic buyer, and one Goldengate, a

financial buyer. Salinas had been reportedly conducting due diligence since the petition date and the Committee was informed early on that Salinas might be interested in acquiring the whole chain. The Committee understood from the get go that Salinas had, as anyone would have, two threshold issues in order to get into a position to be able to buy the company as a going concern, financing and trade creditor support.

As to the financing, the strategic buyer faced what turned out to be insurmountable challenges. The Committee was in close contact with the bank counsel on, virtually, a daily basis to find out how this bank group felt with respect to the Salinas Group. It was early told to the Committee that at the level needed to finance a 500 store chain this bank group could not get sufficient financing and that a maximum amount of financing it would get would be substantially less than the financing the company went into the bankruptcy case with.

Despite continued optimism from the Debtors to the Committee about the ability of Salinas Group to obtain financing, the conversations the Committee had consistently with the bank did not pretend such optimism. The message the Committee consistently received that it was impossible to find the full level of financing and, ultimately, that and that the buyer faced substantial challenges to any sort of financing from this bank group. Prior to the auction this bank group informed the Committee that they would not be in a position to

provide any financing to this buyer.

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The Debtors informed the Committee that it was exploring financing from lenders outside existing syndicate to support a transaction. The Debtors also explained that it was developing alternative business plans which required less financing. Despite repeated requests the Creditors' committee never received any commitment letter from any lender indicating a willingness or desire to finance the buyer at any level. Accordingly, there was never presented any evidence that the Committee found credible other than the Debtors' optimism when we understand why the Debtors would try to be optimistic and try to save the company, but the Committee never received any evidence that this buyer could obtain the financing necessary 14 \parallel to consummate the transaction.

On a parallel track here, Your Honor, the buyer is 16 attempting to obtain sufficient commitment from trading partners to provide unsecured credit. As to discussed above the trade creditors because of their own situations and because of the massive losses of hundreds of millions of dollars they had a pre-petition claims were very cautious in their approach. We understood that the buyer met with several trade vendors, some who were on the Committee, some who weren't, in Las Vegas at the Consumer Electronics Convention to discuss the buyers ideas for the business and credit requirements.

Importantly, throughout the process the Committee

told the Debtor that the Committee needed certain information 2 to enable the Committee to evaluate the request for trade credit, request for support of the continued support of the 4 process. First, the Committee needed a copy of the buyer's 5 business plan. Second, the Committee asked many times for a term sheet from a buyer outlining the structure of a transaction. Third, term sheets were indication of interest from financing sources that would be sufficient to support a business plan and fourth, Your Honor, a realistic time line for consummating a transaction and what were the conditions that would have to be met in order to get to a transaction.

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Incredulously, Your Honor, notwithstanding the Committee's repeated request for information and access to the buyer, the buyer, virtually, ignored -- this is Salinas we're talking about -- Salinas, virtually, ignored the Committee. After the Committee's urging, the Debtor put the Committee's investment banker in touch with the buyer's investment banker right before the holiday season. The Creditors' committee investment banker, Jeffries, reiterated to Salinas' bankers the desire to work with the buyer and provided the buyer with a roadmap. This is what you need to do in order to get Committee support for a going concern.

The Committee asked for access to the buyer's principles to make a presentation and then that caller was told they were not available. Never were the principles or anyone

on behalf of the Salinas Group did they ever ask for a forum 2 with the Committee as an entity. On January 5th, the Committee did hear back from the buyer -- the Committee didn't hear back 4 from the buyer and didn't receive any information as requested $5 \parallel$ up to that point. At the Committee's insistence a second call happened between Jeffries and the banker. Again, reiteration of request for the information that had now been out for three weeks.

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On January 8th, the Debtors provided the Committee with a copy of the presentation that had been made to certain of the vendors in Las Vegas. Through all this time no contact 12∥other than a couple of calls with the buyer which led the Committee to form -- start forming certain conclusions on the process and the ability of this buyer to, ultimately, consummate a transaction. There was a third call on January 9th after the motion was unsealed and the Committee was told that the Salinas Group would not be submitting a bid by the January 10th deadline, that the unsealing of the motion had caused them to potentially rethink their strategy. They were going to work over the weekend and they were going to come back and let the Committee and the Debtor know where they stood, but that they would not be submitting a bid.

The communication between our firm as counsel to the Committee and Salinas' counsel was even more overwhelming. reached out to Salinas' counsel before the trade show

convention. Told counsel, "This is what you need to do to get 2 the Committee's support." It was a five minute conversation. 3 No conversations followed. Not once were we called by counsel 4 to talk about the structure of a transaction, to talk through 5 dideas, to let us know what they were thinking, what they were working through, to give the Committee something to hold its hand upon when the Debtor would come back and seek an extension of the process which the Committee expected. The Committee wanted to support a transaction. The Committee's always to support a transaction and is deeply saddened that the transaction hasn't occurred.

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At the same time as the lack of communication between 13 the Committee and Salinas, the Debtors advised the Committee that they were running numbers on alternative models which they could believe could possibly financed. First, there was a 306 store chain model, then there was 180 store chain concept the last one of which surfaced in the day or hours before the 18 auction.

Importantly, as far as the Committee is concerned this was not a buyer coming to the Committee and saying this is our proposal. This was the Debtor trying desperately and I say this with great respect. The work that the Debtors' professionals and the Debtors' management put in to try to make this happen deserves a lot of accommodation. They did everything they could, but this was the Debtors' proposal.

1 never once heard that this buyer was supportive of this We heard what the Debtor was saying. We were 2 proposal. hearing this from the buyer.

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And to this day even after the auction or even during 5 the auction when we were in the same building for virtually three days, did Salinas' counsel representatives come and approach us and say, "This is a plan that could work. This is what we need. Here's a structure. Here's terms." And to this day we haven't received the signed term sheet. We haven't received a financing commitment, at all. We haven't received a critical path to a plan and we haven't received the conditions 12 that were necessary to get there.

We understand that the expedited nature of this process, and the complexity of the Debtor's business operations and the thought and effort required to consummate a transaction. This is one of the biggest companies in the United States. This has a lot of aspects. We appreciate that 18 these transactions are not put together overnight.

However, this buyer was involved from the get go of the case. There's been eight weeks from what we've been told. There's been substantial time and effort both by business people and financial professionals conducting due diligence. It's a little incredulous that they have not been able to put pen to paper to provide us, at least, a roadmap, to provide us, at least, an idea of how they get to Point A to Point B.

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every time the Committee was informed by the Debtor that $2 \parallel$ Salinas might do this or might do that we appreciated that. Wе expected that to come. It never came.

Your Honor, Goldengate was the other buyer and we 5 understand it's been on the scene off and on over the last few They were well regarded, well respected financial weeks. buyer. As with the strategic buyer, the communication between Goldengate and the Committee was virtually nonexistent. Counsel has never spoken. Counsel for one of the buyers trying to take the chain out of a bankruptcy who's serious and they spend time and money we understand has never picked up the telephone to call the Committee counsel and say, "What do you need to support this transaction?"

There's been one form of communication between the investment advisors. We received an indication of interest that was two pages that, basically, was as vague as could be. They were in. They were out over the last couple of weeks. heard that they were even going to be showing up yesterday. Didn't show up to the auction, at least, they didn't come to speak to us.

What the Committee did know about the Goldengate transaction and, in fact, the Salinas transaction was that -well, first the Goldengate transaction. We were told by the Goldengate transaction there would be no cash to pay administrative claims or unsecured claims and, potentially,

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some paper given to the estate. Clearly inferior to a 2 | liquidation which would have produced more value under the terms negotiated with the Great American Group.

With respect to Salinas, there was some idea of some 5 type of cash. Wasn't clear it was going to be sufficient to 6 pay administrative claims. There was some thought about some type of payment to unsecureds which would have had problems in not paying administrative claims in full. So, from a value standpoint which is not the only thing the Committee looked at, 10∥but from a value standpoint contrary to a typical going concern transaction which produces more value it was blatantly clear 12∥that either of these transactions would produce meaningful less 13 value.

As discussed above, Your Honor, with the exception of somewhat an encouraging week of financial performance, the performance has been dismal and the Committee's financial advisors continued -- and there's the Committee's financial advisors expected there to be a continued financial drain on this estate if the process was prolonged. It's against that back up, Your Honor, that the Debtors' asked the Committee to agree to a four-day continuance of the process.

The Committee has, from the commencement of the case, Your Honor, continues to take its fiduciary duty very seriously. It also takes the effect that its actions would have on this community very seriously and has been supportive

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1 for Your Honor at the hearings notwithstanding the concerns 2 that have been addressed privately, but we believe it as important in a public manner given the scrutiny that this case $4 \parallel$ has experienced to be supportive of the Debtor and try to work out our issues and concerns with the Debtor separately. And they've given us access, and we've had discussions with them, and they've been very good in the consultation process, no complaints there.

We spent a lot of time evaluating the Debtors' business, evaluating business plans, evaluating options, evaluating the prospects for completing a sound transaction and the deterioration of business. What the Committee's had to do is attempt to balance the goals and the responsibilities of achieving the going concern transaction and maximizing value for unsecured creditors. This is a difficult job in any case made more difficult in this case by the composition of the Committee which included varying different types of creditors 18 with varying different types of interests and views.

Based upon the perceived progress of the buyers, Your Honor, the continued deterioration and the likelihood that a going concern transaction would produce less value the Committee determined that continued prolongation of the process was unlikely to bear any fruit and would just lead to continued erosion of the Debtors' business. If the Committee thought that there was any reasonable chance that there would be a

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transaction that could occur the Committee would have 2 authorized the Debtor to go another few days. The Committee saw nothing near the process.

As I hope my presentation demonstrates, Your Honor, the Committee's decision in this case was not an easy one. 6 refusing to consent to more time the Committee was mindful of what the result would be, that would be a global liquidation of the company and the hardship that would reverberate through the employees -- the loyal employees of the company, management, vendors, this community, the communities around the country and is not a decision that was made lightly. Committee wishes that circumstances were different, Your Honor, but, unfortunately, in this case it made the decision based upon the foregoing factors and the exercise of it's fiduciary duty. Thank you, Your Honor.

> Thank you, sir. Mr. Galardi? THE COURT:

MR. GALARDI: Yes. Your Honor, may I make one It's not global. I -- Your Honor has been called by 18 comment? Canada before and I don't want anyone to think Canada is still proceeding as a going concern and there are going concern bids with Canada, so I didn't want that comment to suggest that there is still not a going concern in the Canada business because I know we've been very sensitive about Canada.

THE COURT: Thank you for that clarification. 25 | question to you is, is there any reasonable chance a going

concern sale can be achieved if you have an additional four days?

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MR. GALARDI: Your Honor, I couldn't say that we $4 \parallel$ could consummate a transaction. That's, I think, where the Committee is in those four days. We were hopeful that with the extra time for those three -- actually, the three days, I think, we -- four days with the weekend, Your Honor, was that we would hopefully achieve what the Committee has insisted on whether it was -- we couldn't have financing commitments. We've been told that. Well, we were told by one party is they may be able to raise a certain amount of money for that period of time, but it was not enough to offset what they believed the deterioration of the collateral was. We had tried to put the money in in a position that would be below the banks, above the vendors, but then you have the subordination issue which only exacerbates the situation if you don't close.

Does the management team believe that there is a 18 viable business somewhere whether it's 305 or 180? Absolutely, Your Honor. Do we be able to achieve that in three days? No, we could not achieve that closing in three days. Do we believe -- and I'm sure everybody here is investment bankers and management teams, if I only knew I could, I should have had three more days I could've achieved something. I think we could've achieved something, but Your Honor -- and I think the Committee it's a hollow victory what we would achieve because

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1 what is absolutely clear and we make such about not having 2 pieces of paper. It's hard to have pieces of paper that say, "I will have 400 million of trade vendor support," and have a 4 Committee composed of six vendors reject that because those six 5 vendors are there for a reason. They're our top ten creditors. 6 If they're not giving trade support how can somebody be taken seriously.

So, it's a chicken and egg problem that we have dealt with since the very day I got -- came to the company that the banks have dealt with. The banks will say, "Well, you need trade support. That means you need letters." Do I have commitments from the vendors? Well, if the Committee wouldn't give a four-day extension why should be believe you'll even get 14 there?

We have the Las Vegas letters, but they're not commitments, Your Honor. They're not lawyer letters that saw, "I will commit to \$100 million of financing." We need that financing and when it Committee that has vendors, as many vendors as a majority are unprepared to extend that says something. It says that those vendors who this business would be dependant on are not yet prepared for good business or other reasons. They are not prepared in three days to say they're going to have trade credit and a buyer's not going to waste their time continuing this if you don't get trades abetted. This company as all retailers greatly depend, if not entirely

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depend, of the continued support and trade credit of vendors.

So, the simply answer, no, Your Honor, I can't consummate a sale in four days. I don't even know if I could get firm commitments because the commitments are going to have 5 outs that you're going to have to have trade credit. And I've 6 got a Committee that consists of six members who have, at least, as a majority -- maybe there are some supporters, will not give that trade credit two of whom are not even vulnerable for any liability because they have credit insurance and we were unable to get credit insurance.

So, that's our problem, so I can't say to you today 12∥we could do that. Hope springs eternal, but we actually had people that were still interested even interested that sat through the three days that we sat through in those conference rooms, people that said we put 50 million and the Committee says, "Put it below us in a non-refundable deposit." That's not going to happen when the Committee doesn't even want to bet on themselves.

So, I think the simple answer is do we believe with 30 days could we get there? Sure. That's they proposal we had made. We can't say we can compensate people for the deterioration. That's the fiduciary duty issue that we all faced and I can't say I can get bank commitments because I can't bet a bank commitment without trade vendors and I can't get trade vendors without some bank commitment.

So, again, that's my dilemma. Three days would not 2 do it, Your Honor, but three days may have gotten us that much closer to give people confidence, but I just can't do it and I $4 \parallel$ am in default under the DIP. And I understand why lenders 5 don't lend without trade support when it Committee doesn't support. I understand why trade support doesn't give trade support if they don't see a business plan. It's just a very unfortunate fact because there is, I think, a profitable business within the 574 chain stores. THE COURT: Thank you. The Court's going to take a 30 minutes recess. We'll come back at 1:30, actually, a 25

minutes recess, so people in the courtroom can look at the guidelines that Mr. Galardi has circulated.

UNIDENTIFIED ATTORNEY: Your Honor?

MR. GALARDI: Post order and guidelines here, Your Honor, for people.

THE COURT: Thank you.

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UNIDENTIFIED ATTORNEY: Your Honor?

THE CLERK: All rise. The Court is now in recess.

20 (Recess)

THE CLERK: Please be seated and come to order. 21

MR. GALARDI: Your Honor, I'll look for guidance to you as to how you would proceed. I don't -- we have a number of objections. I think one thing I have to say on the record so that it may help with some people in the courtroom and also

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on the phone because they'll ask. It may be obvious to some of 2 us. There's noting to assume any contracts under this agreement. So, there is no attempt to assume contracts. 4 will still be the Debtors' obligation until there's a lease. $5 \parallel \text{It's still the Debtors' obligation with respect to executory}$ contract, with respect to performing of services, with respect to utilities. We have a pass through or we're getting reimbursed for those expenses, but it is literally an agency agreement and all of the rights and remedies of any contract party including these parties are to be exercised against the Debtors with respect to their leases. If there are issues and I know we'll have issues with perhaps sale guidelines and other sorts of issues, but with respect to contracts none are being assumed and assigned today, none are being rejected today and we are not trying to delegate our responsibility to the agent. It is still a Debtor obligation.

With that, Your Honor, I'd ask you how you would like I don't know if parties wanted to have evidence or to proceed? question the evidence or we go through objections to the sale, however you would like to proceed.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you. I've read the agency agreement and I read it exactly the way that you represented it on the record, Mr. Galardi. What I would like to do is hear any objections that any party has to the agency agreement. Does any party wish to be heard? Maybe this is

easier than you --

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MS. ANDERSON: Your Honor, Margaret Anderson on behalf of Old Republic Insurance Company.

THE COURT: We'll take objections in the courtroom first and then I'll hear objections on the phone.

MS. ANDERSON: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MR. GALARDI: Your Honor, would it be best if we just go from A through and just through them as a housekeeping matter instead of just doing it that way we can keep track.

That will be fine. That makes good THE COURT: 12 sense, so we'll hear first the --

MR. GALARDI: Your Honor, what I have is on actually Page 25 of my amended agenda and the first one that I have is response to an partial objection by Children's Discovery Centers of America, Inc. and --

THE COURT: All right. Does anybody wish to be heard in connection with the objection of Children's Discovery 19 Centers of America?

THE COURT: All right. Let's move on then.

MR. GALARDI: Your Honor, the joint objection of the taxing authorities -- Texas taxing authorities. It's probably Michael Reed and Beth Weller (phonetic). I understand what they want. We will -- we're going to talk about segregating funds. I know they have legal counsel. Maybe I'm wrong which

taxing authority.

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MR. CHARBONEAU: I believe he is, Your Honor. Joel Charboneau, C-h-a-r-b as in boy, o-n-e-a-u, here on behalf of Arlington ISD and related parties and then Louisville Independent School District. On the phone are Elizabeth Banda and Andrea Sheehan (phonetic) and I know that they wanted to take this opportunity to address the Court.

THE COURT: Okay. Those parties on the phone may address the Court.

MS. ANDERSON: Margaret Anderson, Your Honor, on behalf of Old Republic Insurance Company. I'm sorry. I --THE COURT: We're going to get to Old Republic in just a minute.

MS. ANDERSON: I'm sorry.

THE COURT: I think we're looking for the Texas Taxing Authorities counsel on the phone.

MS. BANDA: Yes, Your Honor, Elizabeth Banda on 18 behalf of Arlington Independent School District, et al. and as Mr. Galardi mentioned if he is going to be segregating those funds I believe that maybe we can discuss further with him that segregation.

MR. GALARDI: Your Honor, with respect to taxes having done these sales before with those jurisdictions. There are a few of them that have secured. We'll enter into separate stipulations where we can reserve funds to determine the

1 priority and extent of the liens and it's just easier to take $2 \parallel$ that out of the proceeds. What we'll do is enter into stipulations myself and Mr. Fredericks will contact them or 4 they should contact us and deal with that by separate 5 stipulation.

All right. So, that will be dealt with THE COURT: by separate stipulations, is that satisfactory?

MS. BANDA: That is satisfactory to Arlington ISD, et al., Your Honor.

> THE COURT: All right.

MR. GALARDI: I just got the Texas Taxing Authority 12 incorrect, but --

THE COURT: All right.

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MR. GALARDI: -- I've done it a few times.

MS. ROMERO: Your Honor, that would be the same for Martha Romero who's representing the Riverside County taxing authority.

THE COURT: All right. Which letter objection is 18 19 yours?

MR. CHARBONEAU: On the docket, Your Honor, Joel Charboneau, it is Letter R. And Joel Charboneau here again. Local counsel for Riverside County, California, and I filed a 23 motion to have Martha Romero admitted pro hac vice and we would 24 request that the court enter that order. It was submitted, but 25 returnee. There were some confusion about the motion being

filed and it was.

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THE COURT: All right. Very good. The motion pro hac will be granted and then the objection of Riverside County 4 will be resolved through separate stipulation.

MR. CLARK: Your Honor, this is Robert Clark, $6\parallel$ assistant Douglas County attorney. That's Douglas County, Colorado. We filed objections on January 12th, but for some reason they don't show up on the agenda for today. I think our treatment would want to be the same as for the other taxing authorities and we can work that out separately as long we have a fair crack at the proceeds according to our lien.

THE COURT: All right. Is that acceptable, Mr. 13 Galardi?

MR. GALARDI: That's acceptable, Your Honor. We're going to try to resolve all of those, but as long as they 16 attach to the kinds of proceeds we get here because there's 17 some confusion sometimes. If they attach to the personal 18 properties as being sold and then as long as Mr. Burman's (phonetic) clients and we and the Committee all have a fair crack at whether those are, in fact, secured proceeds I think it's the way that we'll have to do it here.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. GALARDI: And it will not be an immediate. want to make clear though to people we don't receive under this agency agreement immediate proceeds. There's not a guaranteed

amount. It's not an equity bid. It comes in over time, so it 2 will have to be funded over time in accordance with -- what with a budget, but we will be doing that and we'll work those 4 stipulations out. But, it's not as if we get cash tomorrow and 5 all of a sudden can fund hundreds of million, you know hundreds 6 of thousands and I think it's going to be in the millions of dollars of proceeds we going to have to work out. Just like Mr. Burman's client is going to await a pay down on its facility, other lien creditors are going to have to wait for that as the sale proceeds, but that's exactly what I think all of the State laws require anyway. So, we'll have a timing by which it has to be done by in accordance with the proceeds and how we expect them to come in.

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THE COURT: Very good. Does that resolve Items J and K, as well? That's the Palm Beach County tax collector and another local Texas taxing authority?

MR. REED: Your Honor, this is Michael Reed. represent other Texas tax authorities and we are fine with segregated funds being put apart. We'll have to work with Mr. Galardi to see how that will come out of the proceeds in what sort of order these things will be funded, but I think we should be able to go forward from there. My question, Your Honor, is whether all the aspects of the sale agreement are being -- are subject to approval today, or whether it is the agency agreement and the authorization to proceed with the

liquidation sale that's going to be approved.

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MR. GALARDI: Your Honor, we are seeking approval of the agency agreement, the order, and the sale guidelines. 4 know that there may be concerns by some agencies or other 5 authorities with respect to the sale guidelines and I'll address those as we go through the objections, but we're seeking full authority to proceed with the sale starting tomorrow according to the guidelines and then to work with the proceeds as if we were liquidating -- that we are liquidating the inventory in the various jurisdictions; Colorado, Texas, whatever the state is, and segregate out of the proceeds from those jurisdictions in a mechanism that is acceptable to those authorities and to the -- our current DIP lender.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you, Mr. Galardi.

MR. REED: Your Honor, in that case, you know, there has been no form of order circulated that would approve it in some of the -- some aspects of the motion itself held provisions that would be compromising to the position of these tax authorities, vis-a-vis, rights that are granted in the DIP, what it says regarding proceeds as they'll all be handled regarding the DIP, but the Texas taxing jurisdictions reserve the right to object at this time to the establishment of that escrow and it would need to be clear in the order that this was going to happen.

THE COURT: Mr. Galardi is going to enter into

1 separate stipulations we're the taxing authorities on that. 2 Obviously, if you don't feel that your concerns are getting proper treatment you can always come back to this Court, you 4 know, on an emergency basis or whatever, you know, basis you 5 need to get relief from the Court. But, I think that separate stipulations will address the issues, at least as they've been presented to me today.

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MR. GALARDI: And, Your Honor, I do want to make clear to the taxing authorities that there's the sale of the inventory. There is not at this time other personal property that's being sold. And there's only an option to sell the furniture, fixtures and equipment, which a lot of their liens may attach to, and that's not going to happen for a month or 14 \parallel two from what I understand. It's the process.

So, I want to be clear that when we're granting this 16 relief we want to make sure, 1) that their lien actually attaches to the stuff, the inventory that they're selling. 18 | That'll be the funding mechanism, and then 2) is, we sell proceeds. It will attach to that. So, that's why I want to work it out if -- but we will work it out. I know most of the taxing authorities and I'm sure we'll be able to address it.

THE COURT: All right. Very good.

MR. CHARBONEAU: Your Honor, really quickly. Joel Charboneau here on behalf of Palm Beach County Tax Collector. We filed a motion in pro hac vice to get Ben -- I'm sorry --

Brian Hamlin admitted before the Court. I ask the Court to 2 grant that order and it's been submitted to the Court. Brian is on the phone and the Court addressed Letter J which was that objection and I'll let Mr. Hamlin speak to that.

THE COURT: Mr. Hamlin?

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MR. HAMLIN: Yes, Your Honor. Thank you for the Court's courtesy and time this afternoon. I've heard all the prior arguments and I agree, Your Honor. I just wanted to bring to the Court's attention, I know we heard a lot of concern about the loss of jobs and it's a concern here in Palm Beach County, as well. And the aspect of the taxes are 2008 pre-petition taxes become delinquent on April 1 and we are still providing, you know, the public safety and welfare on behalf of the buildings and the assets of the debtor. work with debtor's counsel and see if we can work something out.

And we have the second aspect or second factor issue with respect to our taxes of 2009 taxes which are now post-petition. I just wanted to let debtor's counsel know we'll work with them and let the Court know that these are the issues that we're concerned about and we'd like to get these taxes paid because we are providing these services right now whether we want to or not. And in addition to the loss of the tax base itself in the community and the loss of jobs in the community, we'd like to be as aggressive possible to see what we can do to

get these uncontested tax amounts paid. They're secured by a 2 statutory first lien.

I believe most of the ad valorem tax issues around 4 the country are similar in nature, and it is on tangible $5 \parallel \text{property}$. It is not on the inventory. So, we look forward to working with counsel and see if we can do this as efficiently as possible rather than waiting for claims objections down the road because I think our facts are relatively uncontested. Thank you very much, Your Honor. And we'll work with a separate order.

Thank you, Mr. Hamlin. Yes, ma'am? 11 THE COURT:

12 MS. SOUTH: Your Honor, Rhysa South with Henrico

County Attorney's Office. You had asked about Item K. 13

THE COURT: Yes.

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MS. SOUTH: That is the County's objection. We've spoken with debtor's counsel and we're amenable to the segregation of funds. I've also spoken with Mr. Feldman about an issue on the going out of business sale which I think he'll address in a moment.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

MS. SOUTH: Thank you.

THE COURT: All right. So, I think that we've addressed all of the taxing authorities. That, I guess, takes us up to Item C.

MR. GALARDI: C. And, Your Honor --

MS. ROMERO: Your Honor, can the taxing 1 2 authorities -- Martha Romero from Riverside County, 3 California -- be excused then? 4 THE COURT: Yes. The taxing authorities may be 5 excused if they wish. 6 MS. ROMERO: Thank you. 7 THE COURT: Okay. Item C is the D.L. Peterson Trust. Is counsel here? 8 9 MS. BRAUCHER: Good afternoon. Ann Braucher, DLA 10 Piper. It's B-r-a-u-c-h-e-r, on behalf of D.L. Peterson Trust. Our objection was limited to the facts that our equipment which 11 is leased to the debtors is not addressed specifically in the 12 sale motion, and it seems since I stood up that that is not an 13 issue anymore, that the equipment will not be sold immediately, and also we're happy to hear that no leases are being assumed or rejected today. So, I just state my appearance. 16 17 THE COURT: So, your objection is withdrawn then? MS. BRAUCHER: I think so. 18 19 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. MS. BRAUCHER: Thank you. 20 21 MR. GALARDI: And if it's a lease, Your Honor, I don't think we can sell their property, though we might try at 23 times. The next one is CIM Birch Street, Your Honor. I think it's a statement of cure. I think it's a lease issue, so I'm not sure. I think that's probably a non-issue, but --

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THE COURT: All right. Is counsel here for CIM Birch 2 Street? Okay. I agree that it's a cure issue under a lease and so that would be denied to the extent.

MR. GALARDI: Your Honor, the nest matter is the 5 objection of objecting landlords to motion to sell 6 substantially assets. I don't know if there's an outstanding objection. That was Docket 1569. I don't have a much more specific -- there could be many objecting landlords, Your Honor, so -- that would cover by the title.

MR. NEWMAN: Your Honor, Kevin --

11 THE COURT: Mr. Epps, are you responsible for this 12 one?

MR. NEWMAN: Yes, Your Honor. Kevin Newman, Mentner, Rudin & Trivelpiece, P.C. for each of the objecting landlords noted in Docket 1569. I'm happy to report that that 16 objection's been resolved.

THE COURT: Okay. Be so noted on the docket. Thank 18**∥** you.

MR. NEWMAN: You're welcome.

THE COURT: Okay. The Item Number F is the limited objection of Henrico County. We just heard that one with Ms. South. And then next --

MR. GALARDI: Is -- I have objection of Business 24 | Objects Americas to debtor's motion found at Docket Number 25 1573.

MR. HAGGERTY: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Richard
Haggerty by phone on behalf of Business Objects Americas. I'm
also here on behalf of SAP Retail which is Item H. These are
related objections. And based upon representations by Mr.
Galardi today, it doesn't sound like, at least immediately, the
debtors intend to assign or sell any licenses, leases, or
things like that. These objections had to do with the possible
assignment of software licenses that are held by my respective
clients, and provided that that's not in the offing, I think
our objections have been resolved.
THE COURT: All right. They'll be so noted as
resolved on the docket. Thank you, Mr. Haggerty.
MR. GALARDI: And I can confirm for the gentleman
that those licenses and intellectual property, none are being
assumed and assigned or rejected today pursuant to this motion.
MR. HAGGERTY: Thank you, Mr. Galardi.
THE COURT: All right.
MR. GALARDI: Your Honor, the next one is FM Facility
Management. I know the counsel
MR. PERKINS: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Chris
Perkins from LeClair Ryan on behalf of FM Facility Maintenance.
I'm joined by my co-counsel, Nancy Washington of the Saiber
firm in New Jersey. A motion to admit her pro hac vice is

J&J COURT TRANSCRIBERS, INC.

THE COURT: She may. And your motion pro hac will be

24 currently pending. She'd like to be heard on the objection.

granted.

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MS. WASHINGTON: Thank you, Your Honor. afternoon.

THE COURT: Welcome to the court.

MS. WASHINGTON: Thank you, Your Honor. My client, 6 FM Facility Maintenance, provides nationwide maintenance services to all of Circuit City's retail locations. I just received the agency agreement today. I wasn't involved in the negotiations, not for lack of trying to get into the mix as this was unfolding for the last few days. I am advised by Mr. Galardi that the expenses that relate to my client are 12∥ pass-through expenses. I don't necessarily read the agency agreement that way, but Mr. Galardi is way smarter than I am, so I'm going to take him on his word and then look to work with Mr. Galardi to get the necessary assurances that I need so that my client can continue to perform under the contract, or at the very minimum, I am assured that the contact isn't being rejected today and that I have a reservation of all of my rights under the contract, as well as my right to payment and for my post-petition administrative priority claim, which, by the way, Your Honor, is accruing at a pretty rapid clip given the nationwide services that we provide.

THE COURT: All right. Very good.

MR. GALARDI: I agree with everything except --

The -- nothing in the agency agreement THE COURT:

1 relieves the debtor's responsibility for administrative 2 expenses that your client is -- would incur.

MS. WASHINGTON: Thank you, Your Honor.

MR. GALARDI: I agree, but you're far smarter. Going to J, I think we have dealt with J which is the objection of 6 Palm Beach County.

THE COURT: Yes.

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MR. GALARDI: Again, objection K is a local taxing authority. I think we've objected -- I mean I think we resolved that. And now we come to the L which is the Old 11 Republic Insurance Company objection.

THE COURT: And counsel's tried to speak to several 13 times on that already, so counsel on the phone for Old 14 Republic.

MS. ANDERSON: Yes, sir. Margaret Anderson on behalf 16 of Old Republic Insurance Company.

THE COURT: Okay. And it looks like your local 18 counsel, Kevin Lake, is here, as well.

MR. LAKE: For the record, Your Honor, Kevin Lake on behalf of Old Republic. And, Your Honor, I filed a pro hac motion for Ms. Anderson last night.

THE COURT: Okay. And that pro hac motion will be 23 granted.

> MR. LAKE: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Ms. Anderson, you may proceed.

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MS. ANDERSON: Your Honor, we have objected to the 2 proposed sale and the agency agreement because we view it as a substantial increase and the risk being insured by Old Republic Insurance Company. And, in effect, a defacto assumption of the workers compensation policy. Under the workers compensation policy we insure employees of the debtor. We never meant to underwrite the risk of insuring employees controlled by a third party which would be what would be happening here.

Although technically the retained employees remain as employees of the debtor, they are effectively under the control of the agent and we believe that the facts and circumstances of the going out of business sale substantially increased the risk being incurred by Old Republic, and that we should not be forced through the agency agreement to effectively be forced to enter into a defacto assumption agreement of the policies that the party we never agreed to underwrite.

This is particularly a concern of Old Republic because the policy issued by Old Republic to the debtors is loss-sensitive which means that the debtors and their estates are obligated to reimburse Old Republic for deductible payments under the policy, and the deductible here is significant in size. And those payments to injured workers could go on for years if not decades, and Old Republic effectively is being forced to provide insurance with no assurance that it will be paid.

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THE COURT: All right. Thank you. Mr. Galardi, do 2 you wish to respond?

MR. GALARDI: Yes, Your Honor. First, the agency agreement is not an assumption, it is actually just what it says. It is the appointment of an agent. We are still liable for the control of our employees. Yes, the agent can go in and help liquidate the stores and help direct that, Your Honor, and I think this comes down to 1) we're not assuming and assigning that contract, 2) there's not a date facto assumption. I don't think that concept's in the bankruptcy code, and 3) if there's a basis on which Old Republic wants to move to compel or were not performing, it has its contract rights under 365 and it can come in and do so. I think this is a concern that we can address, but it's not right for an objection to the sale when it's not a sale of their contract, and there is no showing or evidence and we'll put it on an expedited basis that somehow we've increased our risk or not still supervising on employee, so I'd ask that it be overruled.

THE COURT: Ms. Anderson, I'm going to overrule your objection, but it's without prejudice to you being able to bring an appropriate motion before the Court under Section 365 if you are not adequately protected because of the increase risk or for any other reason.

MS. ANDERSON: Thank you, Your Honor. We will try to 25 work with the debtors to reach a business solution, but if

we're unable to do so we'll be filing the appropriate motion for relief from stay to abolish -- to terminate the policies.

THE COURT: Thank you, Ms. Anderson.

MS. ANDERSON: Thank you.

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MR. GALARDI: Your Honor, that brings us to objection of Cormark Inc. to the debtor's proposed sale.

MR. McCullagh: Good afternoon, Your Honor. My name is Neil McCullagh. I'm here on behalf of Cormark Inc. Your Honor, the purpose of Cormark's objection is to preserve its reclamation rights. Your Honor, Cormark is a company based in Illinois that manufactures, among other things, display equipment for the debtor's products. In the latter half of 2008, Cormark sold the debtor approximately a million dollars of cabinets and other equipment that is used by the debtor to display its inventory to the public. Specifically, it's used to display MP3 players and related items to the public. So, I think this product sold by Cormark qualifies as FF&E as opposed to inventory. Cormark filed a timely reclamation demand in late November in the amount of \$205,574.28.

THE COURT: And how does the agency agreement affect your rights for reclamation --

MR. McCULLAGH: Your Honor, I've reviewed it briefly this morning before I came to the hearing. As I understand it, and as I believe Mr. Galardi said, at this point the liquidator is only going to sell inventory --

THE COURT: Right.

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MR. McCULLAGH: -- but has an option to sell FF&E at a later time. The point of my objection and what I would ask the Court to provide in the motion is that Cormark's 5 reclamation rights are not deemed compromised by the agency agreement or the sale. My concern, Your Honor, is that either through the -- well, through the agency agreement in particular, the liquidator might deem themself a good faith purchaser of Cormark's assets and sell those and claim that they have the right to those funds, thereby effectively wiping out Cormark's reclamation rights. Cormark can file a prompt TRO and bring this matter before the Court, but I'm concerned that this sale order could be used by the debtor or by the liquidating agent to claim that those reclamation rights have simply been run over.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you. Mr. Galardi? MR. GALARDI: Your Honor, I have no objection preserving whatever reclamation rights they have, Your Honor, and I have been through the reclamation. I actually believe that they have no reclamation rights based on their demand. But, leaving that aside, they can take whatever. As I said when the reclamation motion was on, they should take whatever procedure because I believe with the change in the bankruptcy code, they actually had to file a TRO probably a month and a half ago.

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So, I don't believe they have reclamation rights, but $2 \parallel$ if that's the action they have to take. I don't want to invite somebody to do it, but I did it before and I'll do it again. So, whatever rights they have, nothing in this order will 5 affect those, but I actually wanted counsel to understand, we don't believe they have any reclamation claims or rights. THE COURT: So, we're not preserving -- we're not creating a right here --MR. GALARDI: We're not creating a right here. That's what we wanted to make sure. THE COURT: -- but to the extent that there is one, 12 it's preserved. MR. GALARDI: That's correct. THE COURT: Okay. MR. McCULLAGH: Thank you. THE COURT: Thank you. All right. The next one is Hagan Properties, Inc. MR. LAKE: For the record, Your Honor, Kevin Lake on behalf of Hagan Properties, a landlord. Your Honor, this morning we entered into an agreement with the liquidator evidenced by an exchange of e-mails which slightly tweaks the sale guidelines as to this particular landlord at its location, and based on that we will withdraw the objection. THE COURT: All right. It will be withdrawn.

J&J COURT TRANSCRIBERS, INC.

Thank you, Your Honor.

MR. LAKE:

MR. GALARDI: Your Honor, and as is standard, there $2 \parallel$ are very many side agreements, and this order approves the entering into such side agreements.

THE COURT: All right. The next one is the objection of TJ Maxx.

MR. GALARDI: Your Honor, I have -- am I wrong? it -- I'm up to O, Cellco.

THE COURT: Oh, I'm sorry. I skipped O. apologize. Cellco Partnership.

MR. GALARDI: Since she sat with us at the auction for a part of the day I thought I'd remember Verizon, Your 12 Honor.

> THE COURT: Okay.

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MS. KALBON: Thank you, Gregg. Thank you, Your Honor. Regina Kalbon again, for the record, for Verizon Wireless. Your Honor, just a couple conceptual comments and 17∥then I had some problems with the order, so I'm not sure how 18 you wanted to handle that. But, conceptually, I guess first 19 and foremost, you know, we are -- it's really unfortunate that the debtor finds itself in this situation, and given the magnitude of this liquidation, we want to make sure that we are coordinated with the debtor. And so, we have asked for a point person, at least from the debtor's business side, as well as from the liquidator.

I have spoken to Mr. Docksdeal (phonetic) of SB

Capital and he is coordinating and heading the liquidation 2 efforts and has assured me that he will get me a coordination person for Verizon so that we're not tripping over each other 4 and we can make an orderly exit from each of these 545 stores. 5 And so, and I -- but I do still need a contact person from the debtor. I still have not gotten that since the last hearing of someone who will coordinate our efforts and our exit from -and our kiosk removal from each of the locations. I don't think it's an issue. I think by now everybody knows that we own the kiosks and we own the inventory that's in the cages.

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Which is locked up separately. THE COURT:

MS. KALBON: It's locked up and I keep describing it, but I went in and made sure I told the liquidator that so that -- but there are four liquidation companies, so again, the concept of being coordinated and making sure that all four of them know that and so we don't have them selling the FF&E, and that is one of the concerns about this agreement. Unlike Hilco, this one does extend to the FF&E, and I just want to make sure that they are aware that the kiosks are property of Verizon and put that on the record and make that part of this record.

Having said that, there are then a couple other things that I need to point out. We ran into one issue with the Hilco liquidation and that is in the print ads. The debtor still has to comply with consumer protection laws and, you

1 know, not having any ads that are misleading, and of course the 2 debtor doesn't intentionally do -- would never do that. we did have a run-in with the State of Arizona that they want 4 to make sure that the disclaimers, when they say everything on 5 sale except for Verizon Wireless products, that it's big enough. So, they -- our argument requires that before the debtor use Verizon Wireless' name in any ad or in any manner that it has pre-approval with Verizon. Verizon Wireless turns around that advertising process pre-approval almost instantaneously, so it doesn't hold up any process.

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So, we just have to make sure that that is complied with, that it's in our agreement. We have to make sure if -in any print ads that they make sure that they're complying with the consumer protection laws. Then there is some language in the order that gave me some pause on that, so if I could turn to that at the appropriate time I'd like to do that.

One more comment. The liquidator's going to be in through March 30th. That is the exit date. There is a ten-day provision where they will give ten days notice to the debtor of an early exit, whether it be the end of January or February, whatever. The liquidator has agreed to add Verizon Wireless to that ten-day early exit notice, so I'd like that included in the order as well since we do have that agreement. So, then, Your Honor, if I may turn to the order that I've tried to absorb because it is a lot to absorb in one sitting.

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THE COURT: What are you going to be doing on behalf 2 of Verizon? Are you just going to remove all of your inventory from the stores at this point and your kiosk, or do you plan to actually do business and continue to sell during the going out of business sale?

MS. KALBON: Well, Your Honor, the way we did it with Hilco was, we continued to operate and sell product, and then at the point in time where it didn't make sense for us to remain in the store because either traffic wasn't enough or whatever, we came upon a mutual schedule that was -- that we agreed with the debtor and we exited those stores. envisioning we'd do the same kind of coordination effort. Ιf we want an earlier exit I guess we can always come to Your Honor if we can't agree with the debtor and file an emergency motion to have our contract rejected. But, at this point we've just been agreeing on the appropriate exit to dates for each of the locations and staying in for the sales. At the same time, the debtor earned commissions on that, so it has been beneficial to both parties.

Mr. Galardi has suggested that with respect to our issues that we do a separate stipulation regarding the procedures and the mechanisms and things that we are concerned about with respect to it which is fine. They generally refer to the -- where the order is requiring the transfer of assets or gives the agent the ability to transfer assets, they're not

 $1 \parallel$ going to be transferring our assets. It uses the word assets, 2 the trademark issue that I mentioned and the sale of the FF&E, so -- the coordination and the advertising issue. So, I would like to just make sure if we can do that in a side letter or stipulation, however that is appropriate. I'm happy to expedite that along that way.

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resolved, but --

THE COURT: And I think that's the best relief you can get because then you'll be able to tailor it to your needs. If you do have a problem you know you can come back to this Court and get the relief that you need.

MS. KALBON: I thank Your Honor. We'll work diligently with the debtor to do that quickly so that we're not -- we're all in sync. Take care.

THE COURT: So now we're up to P, is that right? MR. GALARDI: Yes, Your Honor, and that's an objection of TJ Maxx for adequate protection. I think that's

MS. HUDSON: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Lisa Hudson 19 \parallel on behalf of TJ Maxx of California, LLC here with Steven T. Hoort. I moved for his admission pro hac vice along with Heather Zelevinsky yesterday and that order is pending, but Mr. Hoort would like to be heard.

THE COURT: All right. And the motion for pro hac will be granted.

> Thank you, Your Honor. MS. HUDSON:

MR. HOORT: Thank you, Your Honor. 1 2 THE COURT: Welcome to the court. MR. HOORT: Steven Hoort, Your Honor, Ropes & Gray. 3 Mr. Galardi represented that he is not now -- the debtor's not 5 now seeking authorization to assume, reject, or sell free and clear of leases or subleases, and based on that representation, 6 TJ Maxx of California, LLC is withdrawing its objection. 7 8 THE COURT: Thank you very much, sir. 9 MR. HOORT: Thank you. 10 MR. GALARDI: Your Honor, I'm up to Objection Q which is the joint objection by landlords and --11 MR. PERKINS: Your Honor, Chris Perkins on behalf of 12 various landlords too numerous to list, but it is Docket Number 13 1590, and that objection is withdrawn. 15 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. And R we've already 16 taken care of. That's --17 MR. GALARDI: And R we've already taken care of, Your 18 Honor. I don't know, again, given the notice period, whether 19 there are other parties in the courtroom whose objections we 20 l need to address. 21 THE COURT: Is there any party -- other party --MR. GALARDI: Not that I will invite them. 22 THE COURT: We'll hear from Ms. Pierro first. 23 MS. PIERRO: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Kimberly 24

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25 Pierro here on behalf of Chase Bank USA National Association,

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and I have my co-counsel, Weil, Gotshal & Manges on 2 telephonically who may jump in with some details. The issue we 3 have involves a stipulation that was approved by this Court on 4 December 24th and was negotiated between Chase and Circuit 5 City.

Paragraph 9 of this stipulation provides for what happens when a liquidation happens and the effect of this. particular, there is a withholding of daily settlements provision upon the liquidation up to the amount of \$3 million on notice that there would, in fact, be a liquidation. understand that today Chase received written notice of the complete liquidation of the stores, and so that is going to go into effect immediately and I wanted to get that on the record that it was going to go into effect immediately and would object to anything in the sale order that would contradict that provision of the stipulation.

THE COURT: Is there anything in the sale order that 18 contradicts your -- that provision?

MS. PIERRO: Not that I've seen, but in the sale order that is entered. In addition, under the stipulation Circuit City was required to provide three business days notice to Chase of -- prior to the announcement of a complete liquidation. And as notice was just received today -- it was just announced today -- that provision -- they are in violation of this provision of this stipulation as a result of the

There are issues involved in that violation of the 1 notice. 2 stipulation, including a right to set off.

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There are certain amounts that are owed both ways; 4 Circuit City to Chase and Chase to Circuit City, and in 5 particular, some deadlines for payment are forthcoming and we 6 would ask that the rights to set off that are triggered by a violation of the stipulation and ultimately default of the program agreement be preserved, specifically with these upcoming dates. I understand that we are going to be working with the debtor with regard to rejection of that agreement because it's not an agreement that can be assumed and we would 12 file a motion to compel rejection should we not be able to reach and we would want to get that expedited in front of the 14 Court as soon as possible to wrap that up.

But, in the meantime, as these payments are coming due to Chase we would ask for authority to withhold payments due to be able to assert out setoff rights that would be upcoming and that we believe we would be entitled to that is all being triggered from the liquidation.

THE COURT: So -- but, this you would have to bring on in a separate motion. I mean, you're not objecting to the agency agreement or to the liquidation sale itself, are you?

No, we are not. We are just MS. PIERRO: No. getting on the record the effect of the liquidation that's been announced today.

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Okay. Well, I'll take notice of that, THE COURT: 2 but I think you need to file an appropriate motion. You can certainly bring it on on an expedited basis and the Court will 4∥ hear that, you know, to the extent you're not able to resolve 5 the issue consensually with the debtor, okay?

MR. GALARDI: And, Your Honor, we'd -- I have had contact with the lawyers from Weil Gotshal. There was, obviously, the obvious problem of giving three days notice before this because there was that concern. We'll work with them to try to resolve that three-day issue. We're not trying to prejudice them with that. And then with respect to the other relief, I think, Your Honor, we would support their having to file a separate motion for setoffs and those kinds of things because it could actually damage our cash flow and all the parties that are interested in paying their secured liens and everything else as pay well, that would have a great effect on us.

THE COURT: Yes. Very good.

MR. HOLTZER: Yes, Your Honor. It's Gary Holtzer, Weil Gotshal. Thank you very much for allowing us to participate by phone. Just so the record is clear, the stipulation that this Court has signed already grants JPMorgan Chase relief from the automatic stay to effectuate the setups. We'll work with Mr. Galardi to come up with any additional documents in order to finalize the result of the failure to

1 give the three days notice which, as Mr. Galardi indicates, 2 there wasn't time to give. And if it requires, for example, a motion to compel rejection of our agreement, which is incapable $4 \parallel$ of being assumed now that the stores are being liquidated, $5 \parallel \text{we'll file that very quickly, Your Honor, and bring it on in an}$ expedited fashion so that it doesn't cause any interruption with respect to payments that are potentially going back and forth. I think the next one in question is on the 26th. will file something early in the week if we need to to make sure Your Honor can hear it and resolve it before that's to occur.

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THE COURT: And the Court will accommodate you in that regard, sir.

MR. HOLTZER: Thank you very, very much.

THE COURT: You're welcome. All right. Thank you, Ms. Pierro. Now, Mr. Epps?

MR. EPPS: Good afternoon, Your Honor. A.C. Epps, Jr. on behalf of a number of landlords as the Court is aware. Your Honor, this is -- we have disseminated this order and the procedures to our landlord clients. We don't know offhand if there are any particular problems. We do notice that there is a procedure for a resolution for the Court. What we have discussed with the debtors, and I believe we reached agreement upon, is if a particular landlord cannot work things out with Great American or with the debtor, that they would be entitled

to come in, as it says, on an expedited notice, but the next 2 omnibus hearing date would be acceptable to the debtor for that expedited notice. And in that -- in connection therewith we would ask that if that is what our landlord wants to do that they be allowed to dispense with the motion and order for an expedited hearing if the actual hearing is that date.

Of course. Yes, we can do that. THE COURT: If it's going to be on the next omnibus date then we can do that.

MR. EPPS: Yes, sir. That's the date we're discussing.

> THE COURT: Yes.

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MR. GALARDI: And since they can arise at any time as long as we're going to be here, Your Honor, I don't -- as far as we know we're going to be addressing an issue, that's fine. I'm not -- I don't need a minimum notice or anything of that sort.

> MR. EPPS: Thank you, Your Honor, that's all.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

MR. LEHANE: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Robert Lehane from Kelley, Drye & Warren on behalf of a number of landlords, and also speaking for some of my brethren in the landlord cabal. Commend the very hard work of the estate, the committee, and all the parties over the last several days. Very difficult process.

We had a couple minor comments to the order that we

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just wanted to point out that the estate has agreed to. One is 2 with respect to the abandonment of property, and the property left in the premises pursuant to the automatic rejection in 4 this order is deemed abandoned to the landlords and they can 5 dispose of that property without liability to any third 6 parties. And there is other -- some side agreements with landlords as were noted to the extent there's a rejection. there's not a rejection -- if there's a rejection effectuated by this and there's abandonment issues then that would be abandon and the landlords could dispose of --THE COURT: And this is just liquidation? MR. LEHANE: Right. THE COURT: Right. We're going to take care of 14 rejection at a later date. MR. LEHANE: Right. To the extent of side agreements 16 with landlords, there's just one or two spots in the order where we wanted to clarify that the conduct of the sales is also subject to those side agreements and so those comments 19∥have been dealt with. Thank you very much, Your Honor. THE COURT: Thank you, sir. Anybody else wish to be heard? MS. HERSHEY LORD: Your Honor? MR. FALZONE: Your Honor --

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THE COURT: Let me hear from Mr. Falzone first.

MR. FALZONE: Good afternoon, Judge. Michael Falzone

1 for 50212 A6 Street, LLC and various other landlords. Judge, 2 we have a couple of concerns about the sale guidelines. didn't know if you wanted to take those up now or -- we're still doing the order, but I wanted to make sure that I had a chance to be heard on that.

THE COURT: You can be heard. You don't think you

can work out those -- your concerns with the sale guidelines? MR. FALZONE: I would like to try to work those out with Mr. Galardi. Let me just for the record state that my concerns have to do with -- first of all with the landlords not having access to the premises during the sale. We would like to have the opportunity to show the premises to potential tenants in the event the leases are rejected and to be able to do that during the sale. And the second point is that we would like to have some proof of insurance from the agent in the event that there is damage to the premises during the sale.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you. All right. Now, the person that was on the phone that wanted to raise an objection.

But, I will talk with Mr. Galardi about those issues.

MS. HERSHEY LORD: Good afternoon, Your Honor. name is Nancy Hershey Lord. I'm an assistant attorney general with the State of New York.

> THE COURT: Okay.

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Your Honor, I think that we do not MS. HERSHEY LORD:

1 have -- you do not have written objections from any of the 2 states. I think that was primarily because of the fact that this became a store closing situation with certainty, I guess, 4 midnight last night. Typically the debtors who are seeking to 5 have going out of business or store closing sales know and circulate to the states by e-mail -- they have particular people that they do circulate it to -- the proposed order and the sale guidelines with respect to store closing sales, particularly with respect to the issues of consumer protection and the terms of sales to consumers and the -- and customers -and the terms of returns and exchanges and refunds and gift cards and other consumer-related issues. We did not get such an e-mail midnight last night or since.

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I think I got on the phone and several of the sister states got on the phone when we saw a press release issued a little while ago during this hearing and I guess before this aspect of the hearing that the stores were going to be liquidating. I speak with concern with respect to the fact that the sale quidelines do not contain any of the typical provisions that we do negotiate in these cases with the liquidators and with the debtors and they're silent. I don't know what the proposed order includes.

Typically there are provisions that delineate between liquidation laws and other state laws. They provide a period of time by which the states can come in with respect to

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objections, with respect to liquidation laws, and they also 2 state that there is -- that the order does not affect the states with respect to their other laws of the police and 4 regulatory-type laws. I don't know if any of that is in there. $5 \parallel \text{Again}$, the states have not seen that proposed order.

There are also issues with respect to privacy that we ordinarily seek provisions on, and again, the debtors and the liquidators know all of this. With respect to this agency agreement which I have read, I see that the exchanges and refunds are specifically detailed, and instead of a 30-day return policy, which was typical for Circuit City, they have reduced that to 14 days. And presumably notice of that will go 13 out to consumers.

With respect to gift cards, gift certificates and rebates for which this Court earlier in the case issued an order authorizing the debtor to, if it so desired, to continue all of those gift card programs, and I understand the debtor has. And, in fact, the debtor has continued post-petition to sell gift cards. Just a few minutes ago I went on the website and I think I'm still able to buy a gift card if I so choose.

We don't know what the debtor is going to be doing. The section of the agency agreement that I'm looking at at 9.2(b) says as directed by merchant. Agent will accept merchant's gift certificates, gift cards and rebates prior to the sale commencement date. But, we don't know from this what

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1 the merchant's position is going to be. So, we don't even have 2 the knowledge to provide to consumers as to what they're to do with the gift cards. These are priority claims or 4 administrative expense claims if they were sold since the 5 petition.

So, 1) again, we don't know the answer to that, so I don't know whether to be talking about terms of an objection with respect to gift cards. I've got questions about the website, the e-gift cards, the warranties and guarantees and other customer programs that were in effect before and during this case. So, I would state the objection in that way, say we have not had an opportunity and then we want an opportunity to negotiate the consumer-related issues on the sale guidelines 14 and on the order once we --

THE COURT: All right. Thank you. Mr. Galardi, do 16 you wish to respond?

MR. GALARDI: Yes, Your Honor. Going through 92 and understanding the sensitive nature of all of this, maybe our language, it says as directed by a merchant on gift cards and rebate we have directed the agent to accept the gift cards, so I think that clarifies that issue. We've had discussions, obviously, to honor those, especially pre-petition ones, is to decrease the recovery, but after conversations with the committee and how the best way to get the sales and also get people in the stores still, we are honoring those gift

certificates.

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Your Honor, we were not sure that it was a 30 or 14 days, but when we talk about the return of merchandise, and 4 more importantly the refunds, refunds is cash out of the company, so we are giving notice that the refund policy will be 14 days whether or not it was 14 or 30 and I think that's always complied with most of the AGs. Returns of merchandise, again, we put the 14 days because when you return the merchandise it's going to be difficult to sell again, so we put the 14-day terms on. Again, all of that, we believe is clear from the agreement and consistent with the many, many retail 12 cases that we've done.

We also had, and I think it's important to point out in Paragraph 13 of the sale order, that actually, you know, maybe it's not -- we think it's the state of the art which has been approved in Delaware and New York recently and all the retail provisions. It may not be consistent with every single order, but I think it's important to point out that all of the rights are reserved the governmental units to raise all of these kinds of issues to come in here and to have this Court resolve these matters. We think this language is more than adequate to address it.

Obviously, as counsel concedes, both debtor's counsel, committee counsel and the liquidator's counsel, as well as the bank counsel have done this a couple times before,

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1 know the issues and think we've resolved them all. 2 think I've ever had in my experience, actually, a governmental unit actually show up in court within that 14-day period. they're certainly welcome to look at these. What I would ask Your Honor is to prove this, and if they need to have expedited relief because we submit something, I know Your Honor is available.

But, if there's not a need for expedited relief and there are open issues, again, like we did with the landlords on the sale guidelines, whatever day they want to give notice, if they want to be here on the 29th hearing arguing about those issues, we'll be here, make ourselves available to address them. But, it's at least been my historical experience that between us, the liquidators and the other parties of interest, we've been able to resolve these and not have to come to court on that. I hope that gives the state attorney generals some comfort, and I do apologize for not sending the e-mail at two-thirty last night.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you, Mr. Galardi. think that that would be satisfactory. Does any of the state attorneys general have a problem with their rights being They can come into this court on an expedited basis reserved? or on a non-expedited basis just by noticing up any difficulty you'd have for the next omnibus hearing on the 29th?

MS. HERSHEY LORD: Your Honor, I'd like -- I would

like a commitment from the debtor's attorney if I can have it $2 \parallel$ that he will allow the states to get on a conference call with him so that we could add some sale guidelines that I don't 4 think are going to be objectionable and that we have -- and typically in all the sales. And again, I did not -- I have not seen the proposed order. I looked on PACER and could not find it.

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THE COURT: All your rights are reserved under this order, and so -- and I realize you haven't seen it, but nothing in the order is going to prejudice any right that you have. And if you need to come to the court, you know, on an expedited basis because of some problem you can, but I think Mr. Galardi has represented that he will resolve all of your issues with you, but if for some reason you can't, then this Court will be available to address any concern you have either on an expedited basis or a non-expedited basis.

MR. GALARDI: And, Your Honor, and I give her my commitment, and I'm going to also commit the Gordon Brothers agents and their counsel because, really, this always comes down to their helping to resolve -- not Gordon Brothers. That's the last thing they want to do.

(Laughter)

The great American --MR. GALARDI:

THE COURT: Great American. Thank you.

MR. GALARDI: -- SB Capital, and my apologies, Your

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1 Honor -- to get on a conference call. We have their e-mails. 2 We know the counsel who normally does this. So, we will get that, and if they wanted to schedule a time sometime early next week after they have an opportunity the weekend to review, I'm sure we can have a conference call and try to resolve those issues.

MS. HERSHEY LORD: Your Honor, we appreciate that, and I thank Mr. Galardi for that commitment, and we will do that on Tuesday if possible, or earlier. I just want to just clarify that the agent on the merchant's direction will be accepting gift cards, gift certificates and rebates throughout the entire sale.

> That's what the representation was. THE COURT: Yes.

MS. HERSHEY LORD: Thank you. And, Your Honor, there are some other states on the phone. I don't know if any of them will want to speak up.

THE COURT: Well, this goes for every state. No state is being prejudiced by the entry of the order.

MS. HERSHEY LORD: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MS. WAIT: Your Honor, Carolyn Wait here for the State of Oregon. I had one tiny question. If the determination is to stop accepting gift cards, would it be possible to include in the order a provision that notice would be given to the states of that change?

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THE COURT: Well, what I would prefer is that you 2 talk to Mr. Galardi about this at the conversation on Tuesday or Wednesday of next week whenever that conversation occurs so that there'd be some sort of a uniform provision that is acceptable to the states. If you can't get agreement, then by all means come back here and I will order it.

> MS. WAIT: Thank you, Your Honor.

MS. HERSHEY LORD: Your Honor, it's Ms. Lord again. I failed to mention something. Is the debtor going to be taking down its website and it will, I assume, cease selling gift cards as of today?

MR. GALARDI: Your Honor, we're going to work with --I believe we are going to cease selling gift cards today. to taking down the website and the timing of that, that's another issue because that does have an impact on -- we think it's a valuable website. It may be an asset we want to sell and we wanted to coordinate. The agency agreement actually allows certain access subject to reasonable agreements, I believe, between the parties. So, I can't say today we're taking down the website, and indeed -- and those markets should close faster, people can use their gift cards. So, it does have an advantage to many of the states where you have closed stores, for example, when we closed Regents. So, I don't think it's -- we haven't made a decision yet to close the website down.

MS. HERSHEY LORD: But, you'll stop selling gift cards?

MR. GALARDI: Yes. I believe that's unwise for us to do so, yes.

MS. HERSHEY LORD: Thank you.

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THE COURT: All right. Any other party wish to be heard?

MR. BERLIN: Your Honor, Brett Berlin from Jones Day appearing telephonically on behalf of Jantzen, J-a-n-t-z-e-n, Dynamic Corporation, one of the debtor's landlords. I appreciate very much the opportunity to appear telephonically. Thank you. I will speak briefly.

I just wanted to make what I hope is a clarification for the record with respect to my landlord client which is for similar relief to -- the relief that came up a few minutes ago with one of the other attorneys in the courtroom who was speaking for a group of landlords that under the circumstances my client has not really had any opportunity to review the store closing sale guidelines, and that we would do so and try to work with the debtors. If we have any concerns about them, to resolve those concerns as promptly as possible, but that in the absence of any resolution we would be able to come back before Your Honor, perhaps on January 29th or soon thereafter as possible to get a resolution of any concerns that we cannot resolve with the debtors and the liquidator.

THE COURT: Yes. That applies to all landlords, including your client.

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MR. BERLIN: Thank you very much for the 4 clarification, Your Honor. One last point which is just to inquire of the debtors whether -- is there a particular representative of the liquidator J.V. whose name and number you could announce now on the record for us to contact, or do you want me to just contact you separately to gain that information from you?

MR. GALARDI: I'm going to keep Mr. Raskin's e-mail and phone number confidential, but if you send us an e-mail we will -- we'll give it out unless you think it's wise to give it out.

MR. BERLIN: No, that's fine. I can get in touch with you, Mr. Galardi, and --

MR. GALARDI: And we'll give the -- just give it to us and we'll also go through Wachtell who is representing the Great American Joint Venture. So, they will coordinate the 19 name of the person.

MR. BERLIN: That's fine. I'll contact -- I'll make that contact if I need to do so after my client review the quidelines.

MR. GALARDI: Thank you.

MR. BERLIN: Thank you.

THE COURT: Is there any other party that wish to be

1 heard?

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MR. BILLOWS: Your Honor, Pete Billows on behalf of five of the debtor's landlords. I have had an opportunity to look at the sale guidelines, but I, like most, just received it this morning and haven't had a chance to talk with my clients about them. And certainly we would welcome having a discussion with Great American or whoever we need to discuss a possible resolution to them.

But, I did want to put on the record and note my objection to a couple of the provisions of the sale guidelines, notwithstanding Your Honor's courtesy reservation of rights with respect to them only because the sale is to begin tomorrow and I think that there are a couple of these that are going to affect my clients most immediately. And in looking at the sale guidelines, Your Honor, Letter D of the sale guidelines which is Exhibit 2 to the agency agreement, there is a statement that the merchant and agent shall be permitted to utilize sign walkers. While it's not unusual to see sign walkers in the sale guidelines, I think it is a little unusual to have no limitation on that. And normally we'd come to an agreement that the sign walkers will not be on the shopping center property. Obviously, that raises certain liability issues.

I think if the liquidator were to agree to indemnify for any loss with respect to any liability that a sign walker may cause or may himself or herself incur or damage that they

may incur, that we have that agreement today on the record or
that with respect to my client's properties, that that piece of
the sale guidelines will not be effective until we can come to
some resolution.

With respect to exterior banners which is, again, part of Letter D in the sale guidelines, we certainly have an issue with respect to how the exterior banners may be affixed, and really in cases of liquidations, how they are normally affixed to the building. And notwithstanding the representations that the agent will not make alterations to the store front and exterior walls, we have had experience with -- bad experiences with exterior banners that do cause significant damage to the facade.

And again, we'd want at least today on the record, an agreement from the liquidator that they will pay for any damages caused by the affixation of the exterior banners or in the absence of that a -- again, a carve out of that piece of the sale guidelines with respect to my client's properties.

We'd also like, I think, contact people who are on the ground that are at the various locations.

In addition to talking with the representative of Great America, I think it makes sense if Mr. Galardi would be kind enough to pass along or someone from his office would be kind enough to pass along contact people at the various locations where my clients can more immediately register or

issue -- register issues or complaints with them.

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Finally, Your Honor, in addition to the objection of the sale guidelines, I do want to not ask the Court to 4 reconsider as some of the landlords have done, your decision of 5 a couple of weeks ago regarding the stub rent, but rather renew our motion which we had filed back in December on the stub rent issue based on as you put it, I think, in the order, Your Honor, changed circumstances. The first round of store closings as Your Honor may be aware, there were issues of payment of stub rent under 365(d)(3), and my understanding from conversations before that last hearing with debtor's counsel was that with respect to store closing agreements were being reached by which -- or through which stub rent would be paid.

We also heard earlier, Your Honor, from Mr. Foley with respect to some of the landlord objections or motions to compel pursuant to 365(d)(3) that those motions had been resolved, although we didn't get any specifics about how those were resolved. I don't know whether those were leases that were leases for some of the ongoing store closings or whether they were leases that were similar to the leases of my clients which were -- which are now, you know, subject to the second round of store closings.

So, I'd like to renew that motion only because I think that given the changed circumstances that to the extent that stub rent's been paid for some landlords that there needs 1 to be equitable treatment. I think, Your Honor, when you made 2 your decision which was really based on not giving superior 3 priority to landlords, that that wasn't a decision that you 4 were making by which you were handing to the debtors discretion 5 to give super priority or not. I think it was what it was which was you were not going to make a decision that was going to permit stub rent to be -- or to compel stub rent to be paid immediately.

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So, to the extent that the debtors have chosen to pay stub rent, I think that there needs to be equitable treatment at this point for all landlords given that we really are all in the same boat, assuming that Your Honor approves this agency agreement, and we're talking about a company-wide liquidation. Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you. All right. With regard to the objection to the sale quidelines regarding exterior banners and sign walkers, those objections are overruled without prejudice to counsel being able to renew those either on the 29th or if for some reason on an expedited basis between now and then, and I would like you to direct those concerns to counsel for Great American and get those issues resolved consensually, and if you cannot, then you can come back before this Court. And the motion to reconsider the stub rent issue is also denied. Is there any other party that wishes to be heard in connection with the order or the agency

agreement or the guidelines? Yes, sir.

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MR. FELTMAN: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Feltman from Wachtell Lipton on behalf of the Joint Venture, sometimes referred to as the liquidator. I just wanted to address a couple points. Agree with everything that's been said and I think we've reached reasonable resolutions of every issue that's been raised.

Very early on in the hearing Mr. Galardi described the fundamental economics of the transaction. I just want it to be clear that before either the agent or the company will share in the upside of revenues above the guaranteed amount, part of the guaranteed amount is expenses, and expenses get paid first. Lest it go on the record, otherwise we need to pay from proceeds the expenses of the sale.

Second point to address, the attorney general who I have sympathy for having not seen a lot of what we would've liked for them to have seen had there been time, I think they 18∥will find that a lot of the modern "technology" from recent sales and comparable unfortunate situations of liquidating retailers are built in. The distinction between a safety law and a general law being absolutely required to be followed and not at all affected by this Court versus a GOB sale related law where there's some relief being given, but the states still have the right to come in, object, expedite a notice and so forth.

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So, I think they will be content with that. Also was 2 not mentioned that there is in the order and in the agreement itself restrictions on the use of confidential information. Let me make it clear that we're not buying any confidential information. We're not buying any customer lists. We're not selling any customer lists and so forth.

The Verizon representative was here from Verizon who we spoke to. We certainly absolutely acknowledge that we are not selling inventory that does not belong to the company and that belongs to Verizon. We absolutely will not use their name in any type of advertising that we may due jointly with the debtor. We will, of course, comply with consumer protection laws, and if it is such that you have to say excludes Verizon, we will make every endeavor to cooperate both before -- not before the sale begins because that's basically now, but as soon as possible to figure out in advance how to make that work.

I don't want to promise right now that every single ad that may be subject to such a consumer protection law we will run by them ahead of time, but comparable to our commitment to work with the landlords, to work the attorney general, I'm very confident that we'll make this work, and we will talk to you about protocols and principles, and any standards you've learned from your prior experience we will apply as a general matter. But, I just don't -- I just want to 1 be clear that it's not probably going to be functional to show $2 \parallel \text{ every single ad that may have this ahead of time, and I}$ understood counsel to say that they will be considerate and expeditious and considering, but the truth is, these sales, the $5 \parallel \text{prices}$ change all the time. The discounts change and the process is very quick and we just wanted to --

MS. KALBON: Your Honor, then maybe we can work out a form of that of some sort. We'll try to work --

> THE COURT: That's what I was thinking.

MS. KALBON: We'll work something out.

THE COURT: All right.

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MS. KALBON: Or else be back before Your Honor. 13 Thank you, Your Honor.

MR. FELTMAN: And that was really it. One of the landlords or one the last landlord representatives to speak raised concerns about sign walkers not on the properties. It is our policy not to have the sign walkers on the shopping center properties. We don't -- it was raised. I just want to say we're not committing to indemnify anybody for any damage. A landlord would clearly have under its lease claims as administrative expenses for damages and whatever other rights it has under its lease because those leases have not been rejected and the debtor may have rights against us if we're negligent and so forth, so the landlord, I'm sure, would have some rights. I just want to be clear that we are not as such

indemnifying.

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That being said, we have every intention of putting up signs consistent with both the sale order, with the quidelines, with all the side agreements and technical 5 provisions that the idiosyncratic -- that the landlord's idiosyncratically have and -- but I just wanted to leave it at that. And that's it. We are sorry the company's in the situation it is. We hope that we can bring some return for the remaining stakeholders. Thank you.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you. It has been the Court's experience that while these issues are raised such as sign walkers and banners and such at the front end as grave concerns that they almost always get resolved consensually. But, again, any party that needs to can come back to the Court if that's not the case in this circumstance. All right, Mr. Galardi.

MR. GALARDI: Your Honor, I guess we sadly and reluctantly actually ask that you approve the sale to the Great American Group and allow them to go forward with the agency agreement, the sale guidelines and the proposed form of order.

Thank you. It is indeed unfortunate that THE COURT: the debtor finds itself in the situation that it's in today. This is a very sad day for management, for the employees, for the customers and for the community. Circuit City has been a very good corporate citizen in this community for many years,

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1 and this is probably one of the most difficult things I've been $2 \parallel$ asked to do since I've been on the bench. And I will reluctantly grant your motion and enter that order. Any further business today? MR. KAPLAN: Your Honor? THE COURT: I'm sorry. Who's on the phone? MR. KAPLAN: I'm sorry, Your Honor. This is Gary Kaplan from the Howard Rice law firm in San Francisco. We represent one of the landlords named Eel McKee. And I apologize since this has been gone over already, but is there a proposal as to when the debtors propose to reject the various 12 leases and surrender the premises? THE COURT: No release is being rejected by the 14 Court's order today. MR. GALARDI: Just for the information. We intend to do a lease procedure that will -- that'll address that issue in short order, Your Honor. THE COURT: I assumed that you would. Is there any 19 further business then, Mr. Galardi? MR. GALARDI: No, Your Honor. We'll try to finish up the order before we leave here today or have it submitted as soon as possible. THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

THE CLERK: All rise. The court is now adjourned.

CERTIFICATION

We, Rita Bergen, Amy Rentner and Kathleen Betz, court 3 approved transcribers, certify that the foregoing is a correct 4 transcript from the official electronic sound recording of the $5 \parallel \text{proceedings}$ in the above-entitled matter, and to the best of 6 our ability.

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/s/ Rita Bergen

9 RITA BERGEN

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11 /s/ Amy Rentner

12 AMY RENTNER

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14 /s/ Kathleen Betz DATE: January 19, 2009

15 KATHLEEN BETZ

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